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Coercive Diplomacy Strategy of the EU:

The European Union's Engagement with Iran on Its Nuclear Programme

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ASLI DEGIRMENCI SAGBAKKEN

Für die EU - vielleicht der wichtigste Akteur, der für das Verhindern der weiteren Ausbreitung von Massenzerstörungswaffen eingetreten ist und immer noch eintritt - sind die Verhandlungen mit dem Iran im Zusammenhang mit dem iranischen Nuklear-Programm sehr wichtig; vor allem wenn man auf die zukünftigen weltweiten Sicherheitsmaßnahmen blickt. Wenn aber die Resultate dieser Verhandlungen genauer betrachtet werden wird deutlich, dass sowohl die Strategien der E3, sowie der späteren EU, nur von geringer Bedeutung geblieben sind. Im Großen und Ganzen ist es nicht gelungen den Iran dazu zu bewegen, auf die Forderungen der internationalen Gemeinschaft einzugehen.

Diese Dissertation versucht das Engagement der EU näher zu diskutieren und geht im Besonderen auf die „Coercive Diplomacy“ des Irans ein, um zu untersuchen inwiefern diese Strategie in der Realpolitik des Irans sichtbar wird. Wichtig in diesem Zusammenhang ist zu erörtern, ob diese Art von Diplomatie Erfolge aufzeigt und welche möglichen negativen Konsequenzen sie mitbringt. Auf dem Gebiet der Analysen und Ausarbeitungen der „Coercive Diplomacy“ wird in der vorliegenden Arbeit Alexander George's Theorie als wichtigste Expertenmeinung hinzugezogen.

Stichworte: Coercive Diplomacy, Atomkräfte, Iranisches Atomprogramm, Europäische Union, Sicherheit

As one main actor seeking for non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the negotiations with Iran on its nuclear programme looms large in the EU's aspirations for future security matters. However, considering the outcomes of the negotiation process with Iran so far, it is apparent that both the initial E3 and then the EU strategies could not manage to dissuade Iran from its non-compliance with the demands of the international community. This study tries to examine the European Union's engagement with Iran on its nuclear programme in terms of coercive diplomacy implementations of the EU over Iran. In this regard; the conceptual framework of the coercive diplomacy theory and the practical employment of the theory into the case are respectively dealt with. Thus, the major aim of this thesis is to answer the questions of, first, to what extent the EU has achieved applying a successful coercive diplomacy strategy over Iran and second, what parts of its strategy have not been meeting the conditions favoring an eventual success. With an eye to different depictions and analyzes subscribed by scholars through time, through this study the contributions conducted by Alexander George to the theorization of coercive diplomacy will be taken as the primary methodological assessment.

Keywords: Coercive Diplomacy, Nuclear Power, Iran's Nuclear Programme, European Union, Security

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List of Abbreviations

CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CISADA	Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010
CTBT	Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
EU	European Union
EURATOM	European Atomic Energy Community
NAM	Non-Aligned Movement
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NPT	Non-Proliferation Treaty
TCA	Trade and Cooperation Agreement
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
US/USA	United States/ of America
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction

1. Introduction

The use of force or military means which goes beyond the borders of diplomacy has always been a frequent fact of the international relations history. Concordantly, by the Prussian renowned King, Frederick the Great, diplomacy without arms, erstwhile, was characterized as music without instruments. (Tsouras 2005: 126) On the other hand, it is a well-known fact that diplomacy, as one of the main arts and practices of states, provides them to overcome predicaments, caused by the interest clashes and disagreements, in order to reach compromises through bargaining. Thus, the distinction between diplomacy and using force is not only about their instruments like words or bullets but it is mainly upon the adversaries' relation in terms of interactive motives and the role of understandings, communication, compromise or constraints. (Schelling 1966: 240) At this point, coercive diplomacy plays a connector role for Frederick the Great's point of view and modern diplomacy definition. It gives the opportunity for states to change their opponent's behaviours without using force or by limiting forceful attempts in an international conflict but rather using bargaining techniques in combination with threats. Hence, coercive diplomacy prevents states to welter in a war or in a military strike since the attractiveness and efficient characteristic of coercive diplomacy provide states to act in a safe zone by reducing psychological, political and even physical costs. Loosely speaking, in today's world the techniques of cutting out trade, stopping aid, stirring up public opinion by means of rhetorical discourses and notably nowadays through the resolutions conducted by United Nations Security Council, persuasion, positive inducements and even threatening are being put forward by the states. Therefore coercion might show itself as an effective method of negotiation when being in a tough and threat based international conflict and less so in a standard bargaining process. (Táefí 2006: 4-5) In other words, coercive diplomacy is regarded as in amid of the spectrum between the ones that cannot be resolved by simple negotiation and in highly escalated cases in which pure coercion is necessary.

Many scholars and academicians; i.e. Tom Sauer, Patrick Cronin or Robert Art who based their studies upon the theoretical framework of coercive diplomacy, have conducted substantial and significant analyzes of coercive diplomacy and both the USA and the European Union's engagement methods with Iran and its nuclear programme. However, the case of Iran is still considered as moot even if various precautions

constituting coercive diplomacy pursuance have been taken. The core problem has still yet to find any explanation and is even being escalated by both sides' intimidation attempts towards each other, thus, towards many regional and global actors. For instance; hardly any time passes without the EU intensifying sanctions on Iran, like the last extending trade bans on industries including finance, metals and natural gas, and making other business transactions more impractical (Kanter/Erdbrink 2012) while Iran hardening its rhetoric by saying it would halt all its oil exports if the sanctions would be strengthened. (Gladstone 2012) Therefore, the theoretical framework of coercive diplomacy necessitates an elaboration of a case study in the long-run while existing studies can either provide analyzes of a certain period of time which takes the developments of the issue until their publishing date or they generally focus only on partial dimensions of the issue. In this sense, this paper aims to look at the situation from a broader perspective and to understand the EU's engagement strategies with Iran by using coercive diplomacy techniques while also being attempted to consider both the positive and restrictive dimensions of coercive diplomacy elements. With an eye to the significant definitions of the term subscribed by scholars, the motivation of this thesis is to find out proper answers to the inquiry of to what extend the engagement of the European Union with Iran is successful on carrying out the theoretical conditions of coercive diplomacy and what are the restrictions for the concept itself and also the challenges for the acts of the European Union. Therefore, the primary issues covered in this thesis and the structure of the paper are as follows: after starting with the contributions of scholars on drawing theoretical framework for coercive diplomacy and having a clue on the significance of the term for the EU as heading for being a global security actor, in the second part of the thesis, it will be focused more on the negotiation process with Iran and the methods of the EU while approaching the Iranian Nuclear Programme by also considering their historical relationship and diplomatic descents/ascents in time. This part includes analyzes of engagement in which it is aimed to understand through which occurrences the implication of demand, threat and time limit characteristics of coercive diplomacy over Iran have been realized. Evaluating necessary conditions for prospering coercive diplomacy theory, European Union aspirations for being a strategic actor and its defective exercises of coercive diplomacy are also intended to be investigated. In this manner, the applicability of factors of the term in the process should firstly be tested.

Coercive diplomacy as the term defined by George has three elements. As it is reevaluated by Sauer, the three factors of coercive diplomacy are: 1) the demand which must be formulated before the engagement, 2) the threat in balance with this demand and 3) the time pressure that is necessary to push the opponent for compliance. (Sauer 2007: 2) In the light of George's categorization of conditions for coercive diplomacy, Sauer summarizes the questions which are necessary to ask. According to him the Iranian case should be investigated in accordance with the demand's legitimacy, the opponent's thoughts about possible future demands, the credibility of the threat and time pressure and last but not least the actors' motivations to win the game. As a result of a detailed investigation of strong and weak points of the EU assertions on using security measures and its engagement with the Iran crisis, it is aimed to find out whether EU achieves comprehensiveness on its policies or not, and what role can be depicted for the EU in global scale by using coercive diplomacy. Therefore, throughout a conscientious investigation of contextual and conflict-based variables measuring the viability and the effectiveness of coercive diplomacy, George's theorization provides an overwhelming conceptual framework to answer the questions of how the EU came to the point necessitating use of coercive diplomacy as a mean and how far the EU could become successful in implementation of coercive diplomacy.

The 'Iranian Nuclear Programme' has been one of the major focuses of the international community for a very long time. Yet, the official engagement incentivized by the statement of the United Nations given to Iran in order to abandon its nuclear programme firstly came out in 2003. The IAEA report, being adopted as the legitimate basis by the UN and the EU, was declaring that Iran had violated its NPT Safeguard Agreement with the IAEA because it had failed on informing the officials about the varied activities involving experiments with nuclear materials. (Bergenäs 2010: 491-492) Thus, in 2003, Germany, United Kingdom and France, named as the Big Three, led the negotiations on finding a compromising solution for the Iranian Nuclear Programme. In 2004, with the participation of the later EU High Representative of Foreign and Security Policy, Javier Solana, the negotiation process with Iran acquired a new dimension, and was officially addressed by the European Union (in place of the Big Three). However, the present situation shows that the goal of the international community and the European Union has yet to be accomplished. Iran is still pursuing its fuel cycle activities and still ignoring the international fears regarding its nuclear aspirations for the development of nuclear arsenal. On the other hand, the issue of the

Iranian Nuclear Programme has repeatedly been stated by the European Union as being one of the biggest dangers for the stability in the Middle East region and also for the whole non-proliferation system.

Starting from the dawn of atomic age, the proliferation of nuclear weapons has been one of the major security concerns of the international community. Despite attempts under multilateral agreements controlling arms and strengthening global nuclear governance, estimations over nine nuclear weapon states' possessions indicate that there are 22, 400 intact nuclear warheads in the world.¹ Approximately ninety five percent of all these heads belongs to USA and Russia while one third of total – nearly 8000 warheads- are counted as operational and can be used with a relatively short notice. However, according to Schelling (1966: 246-247), as opposed to common belief, discovery of nuclear weapons was not the first time in human history where man succeeded to destroy major parts of human race. Instead, nuclear weapons brought a threat to our lives, making it possible to employ huge violence without it being necessary to achieve the victory in terms of military means. That is to say; nuclear weapons not only increase the amount of possible destruction but they have the capability to change the speed and sequence of events, power relations between the winner and the loser or the relation between homeland and opposite front.

In a world where nuclear weapons are far from elimination, heading for a leading role in nuclear non-proliferation matters, positive achievements in negotiations with Iran are gaining more importance for the EU in general and regarding its specialized strategies like Weapons of Mass Destruction and nuclear non-proliferation policies. A long-lasting debate among the scholars in international relations and political science, which started in the 1970's, regarding the subject of whether EU is a civilian power (Duchêne 1973) or a potential superpower (Galtung 1973) has taken on a new meaning with Iran's nuclear crisis. Relevantly with this debate, another discussion goes on of whether EU is creating a confrontation with United States which is considered as having coercive inclinations over Middle East. Thus, the Union's attempts towards Iran have been scrutinized. Despite the EU showing a fragmented stance during the Iraq crisis and not reaching a comprehensive unity, 2003 was a significant year for the EU's

1 Although there is an excessive secrecy preventing the public to know nuclear arsenal amounts of the countries, estimation conducted by Noris and Kristensen presents that 1,880 warheads are on different levels of alert. The numbers are: Russia, 960; United States, 810; France, 64; and Britain, 48. (Noris/Kristensen 2010: 77)

aspirations of being a global actor in terms of international security matters. Specifically; in the aftermath of 9/11 and the anti-climax of USA's Iraq invasion, it can be said that EU had more independent approaches towards Iran, as well as the Middle East and Mediterranean, albeit still in a sham fight with USA. Indeed, before 2003 and their initiating of negotiations with Iran, EU had been proceeding to the problems with only issuing non-binding documents or remaining unresponsive in order to balance the internal divisions. (Sauer 2007: 7) In 2003, by the completion of European Security Strategy as an outcome of the first ever supranational hard power tool, European Security and Defense Policy, European Union was asked to be more active in pursuing its strategic objectives. (Council of the European Union 2003: 11) Therefore; after that point EU could be regarded as taking substantial steps towards becoming a global actor by being the major actor on a topic negotiated over one crucial security issue. In the contrary case, abstaining from trying to put the brakes on Iran's nuclear proliferation could indeed have undermined EU's emerging non-proliferation strategy and eventually cause its reputation to be tarnished. In order to preserve NPT's integrity which is imperiled by Iran's rejections, EU was obliged to intervene since it was also a threat to EU's own WMD strategy. In an already hot and bothered environment because of Korean withdrawal from NPT, any risk which could have been caused by Iran's nuclear programme should be stopped before suffering the consequences. Therefore, the case of Iran has become such an ultimate test for the survival of the NPT leading EU to act together to assure the concerns about international non-proliferation regime's being weaker. (Laşan 20076: 32-33) Overall of the reasons, neither a military option nor applying shallow diplomacy techniques could have seemed appropriate to make Iran meet the international community's expectations that he acts in accordance with the obligations of the NPT. In this manner, since the European view was in favor of the threat of sanctions instead of applying sanctions directly, as one of the main authors of the European Security Strategy, British diplomat Robert Cooper, reinforced that coercive diplomacy was seen the most convenient way which gives way to peace meanwhile preventing any great escalation. (Matlary 2009: 203)

Basing upon its past records, the EU has not shown resemblances with the superpowers' behaviours, thus, regarded as a civilian power which uses economic and diplomatic instruments in order to influence other actors in the international field. However, in the view of such information and a broad evaluation of EU's engagement

with Iran, the argument putting emphasis on EU's being a civilian power and its ability to persuade without using coercive measures seems to have many points to be confuted. In other words; related with the nature of coercive diplomacy strategies used by the EU over Iran, it might be unlikely to argue that EU is persistent with its role on civilian power.

2. Coercive Diplomacy: Theoretical Framework and Key Element

"The supreme art of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting." (Sun Tzu)

The act of coercive diplomacy makes it possible for states to achieve their political objectives and instigate their interests without being obliged to wage war literally. Indeed, as Sun Tzu implied, the strategy of coercive diplomacy, (which is one of the most intriguing elements of today's hard power employment techniques), enforces a reconsideration of the interests in terms of calculable costs and benefits for their addressees. (Grey 2011) In point of fact, the very nature of diplomatic negotiation, indispensably, has some coercive inclinations in itself without any need to take coercive diplomacy into consideration. This is because it includes at least two parties giving already certain consent for having diplomatic relations. Indeed, even though the parties mostly see the process as a zero-sum game in which they essay on increasing their own profits, David Icke is suggesting that in the essence of a negotiation it should lay a common interest for each party simply because without a common interest there would be nothing to negotiate on. (Táefí 2006: 11) Where collaboration, concession and moreover compromise are inhibited because of a lack of common interest coercive diplomacy as the conflict resolution means come into play. Hence, besides a philosophical rumination accepting the nature of negotiation as an innate product of power struggle, relying upon the realist explanations of the international relations, it should not be forgotten that every state wants to win more than they lose in the international arena, and the very same state wants to avoid the loss and costs of escalation as much as possible. (Táefí 2006: 15) Therefore it is plausible to say that coercive diplomacy, by falling between a standard bargaining procedure and an active use of force, provides states to bare their teeth without putting major things in jeopardy. Therefore; the nature of emphasizing diplomatic instruments purporting coercive threats instead of using military means at the first stage, makes coercive

diplomacy as a concept attractive both for intellectuals to analyze and for the practitioners of the term.

The ancient concepts, coercion and diplomacy have been separately cogitated about through many ages. However, the theoretical basis of coercive diplomacy was mainly analyzed by different scholars during the Cold War period, elapsed in a confrontation between the United States and Soviet Union. Significantly, Thomas Schelling and afterwards Alexander George have paved the way to understand primarily what the coercive diplomacy means are and how the historical, societal and psychological natures of coercion have evolved in time. Following the studies of Schelling, contrasting deterrence and compellence, George took it further and put some differential lines between coercive diplomacy, deterrence and compellence. Concisely, as he explained, in an attempt to bridge the gap between theory and practice of policymaking George is accepted as a towering figure with his contributions to political psychology, international relations and social science methodology. He aimed to integrate threats, persuasion, positive inducements, and accommodation into a crisis bargaining strategy which can keep the political away from a war scenario and use of military force. Therefore, his works furthering the studies on crisis management, presidential advisory systems and management styles and coercive diplomacy are mentioned as phenomenal for the political theory literature. (Levy 2008: 538-539)

Alexander George (1991: 4) starts his analyzes by describing coercive diplomacy as "to back one's demand on an adversary with a threat of punishment for noncompliance that he will consider credible and potent enough to persuade him to comply with the demand." He emphasizes coercive diplomacy's defensive nature which asks to the opponent to stop or undo an action. Even though naming the strategy as coercive could create some question marks for the argument that coercive diplomacy is used to maintain peace, on the contrary, it in fact tries to combine threats with diplomatic efforts to change a status quo that jeopardizes peace or to cease an ongoing military intervention. This is why he differentiates coercive diplomacy from deterrence, a strategy of the use of influence to preclude the adversary from taking an undesirable action in the future. (George 1991: 4-5) In plain words, coercive diplomacy seeks to persuade the adversary to stop either an ongoing action or to recover an already completed one as opposed to deterrence aiming to prevent unperformed acts.

The second clarification pointed out by George is the difference between coercive diplomacy and Schelling's depiction of compellence which includes the use of threats basically in order to affect the enemy to do something which they would otherwise not do.² Schelling sees the process of coercive diplomacy as a deliberate attempt of one party to preserve the compliance of the other with a demand or set of demands through a threat of punishment and active use of force for non-compliance. His definition, therefore, accords with the 'power' definition of Robert Dahl (1963, quoted in Nye 1990: 177) who describes power as being able to make the others to do what otherwise they would not to do.³ George (1991: 5), unlike Schelling, emphasizes the possible inclusion of positive inducements and accommodation as well as coercive threats in order to persuade the opponent in coercive diplomacy actions instead of encompassing blackmail or bludgeoning as what compellence refers. To put it another way; compellence depends only upon the threat while coercive diplomacy tries to find solutions to the problem by using both carrot and stick. (Táefí 2006: 15)

A definite trend which is evident among scholars who study Alexander George is that his crucial differentiation of these concepts relies upon his understanding of the use of coercion as two opposite ways. These ways are defensive and offensive uses of coercion. (Táefí 2006: 15) According to George and Simons (1994: 8), coercive diplomacy, by definition, means the "defensive strategy that is employed to deal with the efforts of an adversary to change a status quo situation in his own favor rather than an offensive goal of forcing them to do something." Yet, this argument creates some objectivity problems since labeling an action as defensive or offensive is not something precise and it varies from person to person. George assumes that a defensive strategy gives the possibility to convince the opponent by using non-coercive means. However, in this explanation it remains uncertain to what extent coercive diplomacy can avoid being coercive. Indeed, as he exemplifies with testing missiles, the classification between offensive and defensive causes some brain-teasing questions when we think about whether or not testing missiles can be put under a categorization of defensive or offensive. From this point on, he suggests that it would be better to

² The term compellence refers to the use of threats or limited force to induce the opponent into giving up and change its will in accordance with what the coercer desires. (Motwani 2012: 14)

³ For more information see Dahl, Robert, 1961: *Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City*, London: Yale University Press

differentiate between being reactionary and defensive instead of defensive/offensive use of force. (Táefi 2006: 6)

Coercive diplomacy assumes four different variants of the strategy in terms of how the policy maker puts time pressure on the opponent. The names of these variants are identified by Alexander George as the classic ultimatum, the tacit ultimatum, "gradual turning of the screw", and "try and see" approaches. In order to be considered full-fledged, the first and the starkest variant, classic ultimatum must include a demand, a credible and strong enough threat of punishment and a time limit urging the opponent to compliance. Even though classic ultimatum should not be seen as the most effective one among other variants and it is always possible for the adversary to shift from one variant to another during the process, the overall composition of three characteristics of coercive diplomacy (demand, threat and time limit) makes the classic ultimatum the starkest one. On the other hand, tacit ultimatum is the variant in which either the time limit or the threat of punishment are not certainly presented as in classic ultimatum and the adversary prefers to state the sense of urgency and the threats of punishment through explicit manners. The third and fourth variants of coercive diplomacy attempt to the conditions where one of the elements, demand, threat or time limit, is not indicated in the process. Should the adversary give the demand while implementing only one threat without a certain time limit remark, and then prefer to wait and see; this engagement defines a try and see approach. The last approach, gradual turning of the screw, also excludes a sense of urgency; however, it differs from the 'try and see' approach. In 'gradual turning of the screw', the threat is executed in a step by step increasing manner. Even though a classic ultimatum seems more prosperous, gradual turning of the screw as a strategy, for instance, is claimed advantageous in the way of convincing the opponent, by Schelling. (Latzko 1998: 15) Beyond the differenc-

es, as all variants have their own advantages it is always possible for the policy maker to shift from one variant to another during the process. These shifts can even be beneficial if the policy maker could not sustain a consistent sense for the operational purpose.

Implementing a conceptual framework of variants into the case of Iran, EU's demands from Iran which are to have no uranium conversion and no enrichment facilities and eventually not being a nuclear weapon state, EU's protracted threats by not contenting itself with the UN sanctions but putting its own unilateral sanctions and several trials of

the EU to make Iran comply with its demand by giving certain, albeit frustrated, deadlines show that there is a completion of demand, threat and time limit steps of the coercive diplomacy. Hereinbefore mentioned, the analysis of the conceptual framework and the implications on different cases of the coercive diplomacy has since long been a popular trend among the modern literature scholars. In a wide range, there are different coercive diplomacy instances in the history, i.e. from Laos Crisis in 1961-1962, where John F. Kennedy achieved a modest success⁴, to 1990-1998 Iraq case in which USA faced with a difficult target to coerce⁵. However; beyond the last century instances, the application of the coercion can also be accepted as timeless in the history of international conflicts going beyond the modern literature. The essential motives of the coercive diplomacy such as intimidation cannot be regarded as something peculiar to today's world. More or less all human beings, one way or another, have already encountered various implementations of intimidation and deterrents in their lives. Yet, this familiarity of concept to our societal configurations should not lead us to any misinterpretation in the analysis of state behaviours. In other words; while exploring coercive diplomacy applications of states, unlike what can be observed in human relations on an individual level, a certain amount of rationality should be expected without having to consider possible cultural, traditional or psychological disincentives which might affect the opponent's understanding. Hence, George, in explaining the theory of coercive diplomacy, prescribes that the target state and its leaders should own pure rationality and some de facto adequateness like evaluating the situation after acquiring relevant information in order to reach appropriate judgments by perceiving credibility and potency of the threat and lastly taking a position towards the demand in accordance with its own profit. (George 1991: 4) Consecutive to the necessity for having rationality emphasis, he concludes his work after elaborating many different case studies by arguing that coercive diplomacy is a highly context-dependent strategy. (George/Simons 1994: 270) This means that the alternatives of a policy maker in choosing the appropriate variant of coercive

4 Even though the application dynamics of the coercive diplomacy in Laos Crisis strongly strained John F. Kennedy, according to George he managed the situation in one of the best possible ways. Despite the conditions forcing him to close his eyes to Communist control over a large portion of Laos, through his coercive diplomacy strategy Kennedy was able to tolerate the difficulties such as public criticism. (George/Simons 1994: 91-110)

5 When the apparent outcomes are considered, Iraq case in 1990's is accepted as an ineffective example of the coercive diplomacy. To give an example, Alterman claimed that United States has so much struggled with changing Iraq in its coercive diplomacy formalities due to a highly motivated adversary who had been running the administration for a long time and this adversary's success on isolating USA from its allies in the region and also in the international arena. (Alterman 2003: 275-303)

diplomacy are restricted and dependent upon the characteristics of the situation. To have a clear comprehension of what he means with context-dependent, he offers several variables regarding contextual features of the case such as global strategic environment, types of provocation, presence or absence of allies, characteristics of leaders in the crisis, how actors view the destructiveness of war, how the time plays a role and what the commensurable risks and desired situation of the relationship with the adversary after crisis are. (Levy 2008: 540) However, as George makes a warning, it should not be forgotten that not every contextual feature can be applicable with other case. (George/Simons 1994: 270)

By way of explanation, dynamics making the success of coercive diplomacy can be counted as outnumbering. (George 1991: 75) Considering the elements that prepare the convenient environment for a coercive diplomacy application, every relational point coming from history and probabilistic incidents might have an influence on the success. Reminding what George was putting his finger on, situational features of the engagement of the EU with Iran can be best understood by their historical background and how different aspects intervened to encourage the EU for employing coercive diplomacy strategy. In this manner; after going through the theoretical backgrounds of conflict-based factors favoring the success of coercive diplomacy, the next step will be to look at the history in order to give a better overview over the situation of today which is the main goal of this thesis.

3. Conflict-Based Conditional Factors Increasing the Success Rate of Coercive Diplomacy

The contingency of the success of coercive diplomacy is related with five factors as firstly stated by Schelling. According to his itemization, in a coercive diplomacy act, neither the opponent nor the coercer should see the process as a zero-sum game, the threat should be credible enough to convince the target that non-compliance can cause bigger losses, the adversary should also perceive that the threat is credible, the coercer should provide an assurance that he will not ask for more demands in the future and lastly there should be a deadline given to the target state to comply with. (Táefí 2006: 30) Although Schelling made an important categorization by sorting out these conditions, Alexander George presented a broader explanation for the necessary conditions and extends what Schelling offers. As hereinbefore mentioned, while other studies make substantial contributions to the analysis, the selected approach for this

thesis is Alexander George's conceptualization of the term. Providing an overarching method, results of George's analysis, indeed, do not only endeavor to shape the borders of the abstract theory, but in conclusion with several case study implementations, it lays stress on the possibility for coercive diplomacy to be unsuccessful and investigates the conditions affecting the success rate of the theory. Notwithstanding, as he emphasizes a full-fledged ultimatum including demand, threat and time limit dimensions prosperously, does not always give a successful result. Thus, it would be a wrong statement to say that the conditions he listed must be enough to achieve effectiveness. Since no single condition is enough to bring success, and further, not all counted measuring conditions helpful for the success are necessary to be implemented on every case (George/Simons 1994: 279-280), in order to have a better overview for the case of Iran, some factors among what George and Simons set forth should be given more importance. In this sense, along with the analysis of the case of Iran in this thesis, different aspects of other scholars on the categorization of conditions favoring the success of the European Union strategy over Iran will also be paid regard to.

Major characteristics of coercive diplomacy are already listed as the demand, the threat and the time limit. Grounding on George's own expositions Tom Sauer categorized the necessary questions linked to a successful employment of the elements. In this sense; the first question measuring the success rate of coercive diplomacy should start with an evaluation of what the coercer state asks of its opponent. Important dimensions designating the demand could be arrayed as i.e. the size of the demand, the clear explanation of the demand objective, the legitimate basis for the demand, and lastly making the opponent assured of not being asked for more things in the future. The second principal element of coercive diplomacy includes questions measuring the credibility of the threat. In this part, it should be asked whether the threat is proportional to the demand, if the threat is supported and tolerated by the people in the coercer country, how much the target state is fearful about an escalation and how credible the reputation of the coercer state is so far in making threats. Another factor also refers to the credibility of time limit given by the coercer to the adversary. Lastly, an analysis over the strength and the magnitude of motivations of both parties in the conflict gives a clearer picture of the success of concept. (Sauer 2007) Nonetheless, it should also be given particular attention to George's warning that any of these factors are neither sufficient nor should be

necessary. (George 1991: 76) For instance, he argues that while the primary factors could still be important, in a particular case the effectiveness of coercive diplomacy depends upon the last analysis of psychological variables. Thus, the image of the opponent and the political leaders' capability of understanding each other's mind-sets, value system and domestic constraints also become crucial for a healthy implication of the strategy. Since, inadequate information is likely to lead the leaders to attribute their own value system and reasoning processes as if it is equal with their opponent's mind-set, miscalculations and misperceptions are inevitable to face with. (Levy 2008: 540-541)

However, as possible to see in every theoretical framework there are also some hampering factors which create incongruities with the real situation of the practical implementation and harden measuring the success of coercive diplomacy application. The factors obstructing effectiveness of the coercive diplomacy or how to measure its achievements are also subjects of this study to evaluate for a better understanding of the limits of coercive diplomacy in the evolution of European Union's engagement with Iran.

3.1 The Demand

One critical point for the eventual success of coercive diplomacy is the question of how much the coercer demands of the opponent since its gratitude directly effects the motivation of the opponent to comply with it and also the balance of motivation between the parties. This being given, an effective element which can alter the balance of the situation, the strength of the opponent's motivation, is a function of the demand asked to him. A small demand would force the opponent to accept coercion and might spoil the process without any completion of coercive diplomacy success. In fact, this kind of a situation would turn paradoxical since coercive diplomacy, by definition, necessitates a crisis further than one that can be solved by basic negotiation attempts. A similar consequence can be observed when the demand is too great, and hence success of coercive diplomacy would become harder since the opponent strengthens his resistance, gives up material gains and might also venture the political and psychological costs. George exemplifies a restricted demand case by Joseph Kennedy's coercive diplomacy employment during Cuban Missile Crisis which succeeded owing to Kennedy's limiting ambitious objectives. According to him, it was the right choice of Kennedy to ask for the removal of missiles from Cuba instead of asking an overthrow

of Fidel Castro or elimination of Soviet influence from Cuba. By this means Kennedy prevented the risk of Krushev's willing to take greater risks and turning the situation in his favor. (George 1991: 13)

To clarify ideal magnitude of the demand George classifies three different types of demand. While the first type of demand asks for stopping what the opponent is actually doing, the second type requires a demand to undo what it has already done. In a situation where the adversary's reference point for success is equal to preserving status quo, as what Schelling argued, the first category which refers to deter someone not to do something in the future becomes easier than the second type of demand where obliging him to undo what is already performed. (Levy/Thompson 2010: 153) Yet, still the most ambitious type of demand is accepted as the third category of George, implying to make a change in governmental system or regime of the opponent country. (George/Simons 1994: 9) So much so that, demands calling for dramatic changes in existing governments instead of urging to a decent policy change creates problems for the proportionality of demand's scope with demand's objective. Although it is not certain that shrinking the demand would bring success for coercive diplomacy, the contrast between asking for a policy change or a regime change determines a great border line for the proportionality. (Jentleson 2006: 3)

3.1.1 The Clear Explanation of the Demand

Clarity on the objective of the demand provides an advantage to the coercer state for selecting the most-wanted answer among several possible responses that might come from the opponent. Being clear and consistent in respect to what is to be demanded strengthens the coercer state's purpose and thus, the possibility to persuade the opponent. Conversely, if the coercer blurs the demand process and do not give enough assurance that there will not be more demands in the future; it would not be likely for him to come to terms with the coercer. By Sauer's definition he would feel like he is trapped in a "slippery slope" (Sauer 2007: 4).

Where the clarity in the presentation of demands is prominent, George also warns of the necessity of clarity in specific terms formulated by the coercer and agreed upon by both sides. Clarity of the objective lays behind the clarity of words and actions, operating two levels of communication in a coercive diplomacy implication. Words should clarify the meaning in case where actions are perceived as equivocal or bluffs, while the actions play the role of avoiding any possible making light of words. (George

1991: 9-10) Adherence on rationality in the process is described as necessary; notwithstanding, every relationship has its own language. Therefore, sometimes the most profitable situation for both sides is if the coercer provides a formulation of precise terms in regards to termination of the crisis which both sides have already agreed upon and establishes procedures to execute these terms while also verifying their implementation. This might be the best possible way for the coerced state to safeguard against any possibility of the coercing state asking for greater concessions in the later phases or offering more sweeping interpretations of the termination of the crisis. (George 1991: 80-81)

3.1.2 Questioning the Legitimacy of the Demand

Even though George mentions the importance of legitimacy of the demand, he does not state it as a favoring factor for the success of coercive diplomacy. However, legitimacy of the demand encapsulates as much significance as the conditional factors of coercive diplomacy in a conflict. George draws the attention to the legitimacy's importance on procuring international and domestic support while preventing the opponent to have international back up. He (1991: 68) thinks that in such a case the legitimacy sourced from international law is slanted towards the coercer state as opposed to the opponent which is already expected to act aggressively and anomalously. As the statement suggests, international law is given as the de facto legitimacy bearer role to the objective of the demand if it is limited to defensive objectives in a coercive diplomacy act. However, admittedly, legitimacy of the international law has also moot points in itself as accordant with evidential reasoning, even legitimacy as a term has still been central to discussions in both political philosophy and political practice. The sensitive nature of law, especially in the international arena sometimes allows the parties to manipulate the situation on behalf of themselves. For instance, up until 1995 the nuclear weapon states tried to justify the purchase of their existing nuclear arsenals by taking the advantage of literal interpretability of NPT articles in different ways. In respected articles of this agreement it was indicated that states which had not tested nuclear weapons before January 1st 1967*, including USA, Great Britain, China, Soviet Union and France, undertakes not to

* Nuclear Weapon State Party to the Treaty

seek any transfer or manufacture of nuclear weapons while they are also binded to pursue the elimination of nuclear arsenals and the delivery means under the international control. (IAEA: 1970) They firstly argued that the term 'disarmament' in the Article VI is not equal to elimination. Their second argument was claiming that disarmament is conceivable when it is related with conventional disarmament. (Sauer 2006: 336) Since states are not equal in the political reality, the very nature of multilateral agreements depending generally on disproportionate power distribution lead the treaty community into compliance problems.

According to some authors, global governance institutions, in general, carries value with its contributions in creating norms and information which generate coordination and thus, mutual benefits among the international actors.⁶ Hence, besides the criteria regarding institutional structure which refers to the necessity of institutional integrity of these international law executers, the expectation from the law executers to have legitimacy is mainly related with these institutions' multilateral characteristics which assume them to act in accordance with 'normative reasons', which is distinctive from mere strategic or self-interested reasons, and also agreed-upon moral values to a certain extend.⁷ However, there emerges a contradiction when a deeper philosophical rumination is reckoned with the considerations of scholars, for instance those who are appealing to Foucauldian analysis. To illustrate this contradiction, the flaws in the regime constituted by the Non-Proliferation Treaty and institutions backed up by this treaty, i.e. United Nations Security Council can be given as an example. It is believed that together with the International Atomic Energy Agency, NPT is considered as the core element of international efforts on nuclear non-proliferation and they form the non-proliferation discourse by also guiding institutions in the international arena. From a critical standpoint, James Keeley argues that NPT serves for a more normative focus and creates a power struggle by defining signatories and non-signatories. States, therefore, are forced to sign the treaty and when they do reject to ink they can be declared as suspects. So can those who have already signed in if they act against the

6 Keohane and Buchanan make clear identifications for the necessary elements of global governance institutions to be able to have legitimacy. According to this; global governance institution's attributes should refer to a minimal moral acceptability, comparative benefit and institutional integrity. (Keohane/Buchanan 2006)

7 Legitimacy that refers to the right to rule is identified as a normative notion by Keohane and Buchanan. However, normative notion should not be understood basically as the rational self-interest. In other words; an institution is legitimate meaning that it has the right to rule, without the necessity of taking the best interests of everyone subjected to its rule into consideration. (Keohane/Buchanan 2006: 2)

treaty. Thus, even if this labeling is not an authentic situation for NPT, NPT doesn't only work for creating deviants and normalcy, but also sustains a public language which may bring legitimacy to attack and defense, justification and condemnation and also pressure and resistance to this pressure within the regime. (Keeley 1990: 101-102) Despite the fact that critical discourse analysis of international order is worthy of more attention and contemplation, for the sake of a healthy analysis of the case of Iran other aspects should also be focused on enough.

In this manner; another important necessity for the legitimacy of such an international law is its binding force for every signatory to the agreement. Since legitimacy of the international law depends on actual consent of all parties, and any violation of the law could might a leak in legitimacy of the whole agreement, signatory states to the agreement must comply with the same law and they should not act against it. In an opposite case where one state demands of another state to act in compliance with the rule of law but meanwhile not practicing along with the same law themselves, a double standard situation can emerge. Thus, legitimacy has a broader and more sufficient meaning than legality. Any disbelief on the legitimacy of the objective of the demand among the population in the coercer state could prevent the coercer mechanisms to work perpetually and to maintain the policies especially if it's a democratic state. Furthermore, because of the same very reason, public opinion in the coerced state might also start to support their government against any coercion which would eventually be disadvantageous for the coercer state. (Sauer 2007: 3-4)

3.2 The Threat

A state's coercion in our world can include economic sanctions, expulsion from an international organization, suspension of agreements, partly or complete trade bans, travel embargos, etc. However, coercive diplomacy cannot only be described by its way of using coercion. George (1991: 11), himself, also highlights the point that "what the threatened stick cannot achieve by itself, unless it is a very formidable one, may possibly be achieved by combining it with a carrot." Indeed, researches too demonstrate that should carrots and sticks be combined, the effect would be more powerful. In carrots and sticks theory, the effects which decrease any wealth from the status quo situation of the coerced state, in comparison with its ex post wealth, are referring to sticks where if there is a contribution they are named as carrots. (Geest/Mattiacci 2009: 5) Therefore, positive incentives in a successful coercive

diplomacy employment might help to make the concession more acceptable in target states' eyes. (Byman/Waxman 2002: 9-10)

It is beyond doubt that one major portion of a full-fledged coercive diplomacy action is how the threat of punishment is organized in the process. Correlatively, the success of the strategy is mainly dependent on employment of a threat credible and sufficiently potent enough to assure the opponent that he should choose compliance. Defined characteristic of the threat's peculiarity is that the coercer affirms on what he will do - but would manifestly prefer not to do- should the contingency, moulded by the opponent's behaviours, lead him. (Schelling 1960: 123-124) This change in contingencies which is governed by the opponent is, by definition, dependent upon to what extent the threat is credible.

3.2.1 The Credibility of the Threat

One key factor for the success rate of coercive diplomacy is, undoubtedly, the credibility of the threat. In so much that, should the credibility for the capability be tangible but ambiguous, credibility in intangible terms is much more opaque. (Long 2008: 13) This situation can be clearly seen when threatening goes beyond the national borders and becomes a tool in an international crisis. Schelling (1960: 36) illustrates this by noting that "the national homeland and everything "abroad" is the difference between threats that are inherently credible, even if unspoken, and the threats that have to be made credible." However, what is unique in George's definition of coercive diplomacy from what Schelling assumes is a combination in the strategy with use of positive incentives and assurances in addition to threat of punishment. The original idea of George and Schelling was to find better ways to convince the opponent without leading the relations into a military aggression. They both gave an effort to effectuate a guideline on why deterrence failed by looking at the American foreign policy since the World War II. However, what differentiated George from Schelling's studies was his argument that there is a need for deterrence which is in consolidation with a broader strategy where the coercion is combined with assurances and positive inducements. (Levy 2008: 545-546)

Types of threats can be classified as the ones which are inherently persuasive, some needing to be made persuasive, and some that look like bluffs in any case. Those which need to be made credible necessitates, first and foremost, the coercer's commitment to carry out the threats up to the end, or him to create some incentives

for himself, showing that he would not dare to abandon his threats. This can be exemplified by the aim of USA during the Cold War while stationing its troops in Europe to convince Russians that any war in Europe would oblige USA to be involved organically in the confrontation whether or not Soviet Union thought it was likely. (Schelling 1960: 187)

Upon the question of what makes the threat credible, several factors have been pointed out by scholars.⁸ Among these set of contributions, the most relevant determinants with an interim assessment of the case of Iran are, seriatim, proportionality of threat to demand, public opinions' support to threats, escalation dominance, and reputation of the threatening state. (Sauer 2007: 4-5) One important element about the threat is its proportionality to the demand asked to the opponent. Persuasion of the opponent to stop his aggression, without bludgeoning him into ending his act, is the central aim of the coercive diplomacy. In order to reach this aim the coercer state should convince the opponent of the fact that his compliance will not be more costly than the scenario of his non-compliance. The use of force is not included in the strategy unless there is an exemplary use of limited force which might be helpful to increase the credibility of the threat and to give the impression that he can apply greater force in a non-compliance situation. (George/Simons 1994: 9) Thus, the magnitude of the threat whether it includes use of force or not, is expected to be in proportion with the demand, and the available means should be formulated in rational terms in order to be credible. To a certain degree, rational proportionality should be included in what the coercer state claims as a threat since too small threats would not create effective impact, whilst big threats would not be useful in convincing the opponent. (Tocha 2009: 8)

Dependent upon the historical and statistical analysis of Kenneth Schultz, in democratic states, in a crisis situation, if the government and its political adversaries publicly agree on the means of coercion, then the result is highly credible and effective, while if dissenting opinions are dominant there might be a credibility problem for the threatening state. (Schultz 2001: 196) Therefore, even if the outcomes of such a mixture of conditional factors vary from case to case, what provides credibility for

⁸ Exemplary scholars: Hyde-Price 2008 / Schultz 2001 / Sauer 2007 / Tocha 2009

the threatening state is partly reliant on how public opinion perceives these threats. Where, for instance, the negative sanctions come into play, the situation becomes more than a contention between the governments and starts to affect people's daily lives. Sanctions ranging from travel bans and arms embargo to entire trade bans might cause irreversible, great damages for people although they can have positive influence on changing the opponent state's behaviour. (Smith 2004) However, the statistics conducting the rate of success⁹, both within the UN and without, demonstrates that economic sanctions' achievements are poor. (McMahon 2006) Indeed, formerly conducted statistics showed that only two cases out of ten, where comprehensive trade sanctions are executed, will be successful. In the beginning of 1990's, broader sets of sanctions with an extended analysis of scope and content were investigated, and the result showed that only one third of all incidents were successful. Moreover, later analysis of these results even reduced sanctions' chance of success by reporting that only five percent can be counted as bringing success.¹⁰ Thus, especially economic sanctions, instead of putting the things into order, are likely to make the things worse for people both in the threatening and threatened states. The following situation, then, might cause the employers to reconsider their steps and even might lead to an unavoidable weakening of the strategy.

An essential point here, as George (1991: 10-11) accentuates, is that together with threats of punishment, coercive diplomacy should also offer positive incentives which can enhance the flexibility and adoptability of the strategy by bringing prominence to negotiation and bargaining phases of coercive diplomacy. This is why coercive diplomacy is also called 'carrots and sticks' strategy. Related with psychological and physical coerciveness, sticks do have differences in their credibility assurance techniques than carrots. The key for success is then providence of credible reciprocity between the carrots presented by the coercer and the concession of the target state. That is to say; the exchange should be maintained with careful steps guaranteeing that the target state does not think he can benefit from carrots without being obliged to act reciprocally, or contrarily he should not be unsure about the continuation of reciprocity

⁹ The definition of success is also worthy to discuss. Yet, as success is definitive in military strategy either victory or defeat, in retrospect to cases where sanctions were used, the success and failure can be measured with close gradings to this dichotomous classification. (Wallensteen 2000: 5)

¹⁰ Even though the numbers differ from one study to another due to different cases are examined in terms of different measures, according to Wallensteen there is an evident trend on poor success rates for the sanctions. (Wallensteen 2000)

that the costs of concession are worth the return. (Jentleson 2006: 3) The policy maker's role, then, is to find the optimal blend of carrots and sticks for the case, which would not seem as weaknesses in coercive diplomacy, and employ them in the right sequence of combination of coercion, persuasion, positive inducements and compromise.¹¹

Coercive diplomacy implementation can be regarded as not only a strategy employment but also an art. In this manner; effectiveness of the strategy in the final analysis depends more on the psychological variables covering political actors' comprehension ability of adversaries' movements, tactics and decisions. (George/Simons 1994: 76-84) In this scale, it is expected from the threatening party to calculate the costs and risks associations if the threat would be put in force. After their analysis of historical events, George and Smoke (1974, quoted in Levy 2008: 548) in their book concluded that "the initiator tried to satisfy himself before acting that the risks of the particular option he chose could be calculated and... controlled by him so as to give his choice of action the character of a rationally calculated, acceptable risk" Thus, presence of strong and effective leadership provides positive reputation for states in pursuit of their following actions. At this point, although Schelling, albeit not comprehensively, did accept that a certain degree of irrationality in the coercer state's leader might be advantageous for him¹², credible reputation actually depends more on rational choices and actions of the leaders. Since howsoever strategy implementers are all human beings, it becomes crucial for the coercer to make the opponent believe that the process is not managed by feelings like anger or revenge. According to David Hartley's words (1782, quoted in Sparks 1840: 296), in his letter to Benjamin Franklin; "the reputation of nations is not merely a bubble, it

11 The right choice of sequencing the carrots and sticks is exemplified by Kennedy's implementation of coercive diplomacy in the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962. By inducing a withdrawal of Soviet Missiles from Cuba, Kennedy made the right decision on being conciliatory towards Khrushchev when starting with coercive threats and actions. In the initial phase of the crisis, this choice was essential to show his credibility and avoid any image of weakness in the strategy and only then did Kennedy decide to consider concessions. On the other hand, for instance, in Laos crisis in 1961-62 it was not optimal for Kennedy's case to signal his willingness to compromise that early and then continuing with occasional military threats. (Levy 2008: 541)

12 Along with most other analysts, Schelling thinks that some behaviours of the leaders such as the efforts of Richard Nixon to show himself unstable towards Soviet Union by putting nuclear forces on high alert in 1969 in order to convince them that he can do anything, were unpromising. (Long 2008: 15) However, he still believes that there is no problem having a certain degree of irrationality in the way you show what you would do, for the sake of being credible. He exemplifies this argument with mental hospitals in which some inmates make clear to the attendants that they might set fire to their clothes or cut their own veins if they don't have it their own ways. This attitude, in fact, sometimes works out for them. (Schelling 1966: 37-38)

forms their real security.” Hence, establishing a credible threat-employer image and not being seen as a bluffer constitutes higher prominence than having an image.

Another element providing credibility to threats, as also relevant with procurement of legitimacy for the demand, is the absence or presence of domestic and international support which usually makes a difference on the success. As is observed in Vietnam and Nicaraguan cases where American leaders were employing coercive diplomacy, lack of public support can constrain means of the strategy. (George 1991) Since any problem destroying demand’s or threat’s credibility might cause a reverse effect for the strategy on the coerced state’s population, people might start to support their own government which would result in the coerced government’s advantage by increasing his public-support. (Sauer 2007: 4) International support, on the other hand, is crucial for making the target state understand that it lacks the ability to split the multilateral coalition. By this, the credibility of the strategy can be enhanced even more, just as the supportive attitude of the Organization of American States and United Nations helped Kennedy in the Cuban Missile Crisis. In another example, having UN support additively to US sanctions had important consequences for Libya in the way of building better relations with USA and implementing full WMD agreement. (Jentleson 2006: 4-5) Besides the institutional dimension of international support, the general opinion of the international community can also be regarded as influential in today’s world, as the new element in defining power relations. To put it another way, power relations are now not only amenable to law of nations but also it is more compulsory for states to account before public. In a world where empowered peripheries of power started to engage into international discourse which has been incidental to rapid progress of global communication, the world’s public opinion has also become a denominator which is likely for leaders to seek for support.

3.2.2 Escalation Dominance

Coercive diplomacy is the strategy which incorporates interactivity and dynamism including two or more wills. (Hyde-Price 2008: 24) Should this very nature of the concept lead the coercer to arouse the adversary’s fear of an escalation towards a situation where the things are less acceptable for him, then the impact becomes enhanced. A correct use of threatened escalation can be exemplified with the Pearl Harbor case where the threats of USA on putting oil embargo created an escalation in the course of crisis because it was unacceptable for the Japanese. Only then, Japan

realized that their options limited themselves to either the embargo being eased through diplomacy, or there would be a war between the parties. (George/Simons 1994: 285-286) Thus, creating a fear of unacceptable escalation in the opponent's mind, in case he insists on his non-compliance, makes the success easier.

3.3 Time Limit

According to George; in cases where there is an ultimatum or a tacit ultimatum, coercer state's imparting a certain deadline or a sense of urgency for compliance is necessary for the achievement. Given that; should the threat not be accompanied with a certain deadline, it is unlikely that the target state will perceive the threat as credible. (Jakobsen 1998a: 29) On the other hand, it is possible that creating a sense of urgency might backfire and encourage a desperate or committed opponent to wage a war pre-emptively. (George 1991: 78) Thus, one precaution might be awareness of the given time span to the target. This is because if the given time period is too tight in comparison with the magnitude of the demand, time pressure cannot be counted as credible. (Sauer 2007: 5) Conversely if it indicates a broader interval than the demand needs to be accomplished, it might risk that the threatened state decides to give in and might even presume to do delaying tactics. (Jakobsen 1998b: 72) In addition to this, another adverse effect of such protracted crisis is their negative effects over the populations of both countries and thus the phasing out the public support. (George 1991: 78-79) However, it is noteworthy to keep in mind that the success elements are connected to the particularities of the case, thus, traditionally the deadline or time span given by the coercer in order to achieve the last goal changes from incident to incident. The most important thing here is to be able to create a sense of urgency. For instance; in 1911 when Italian government was asking to Ottoman Empire to surrender Libya, it asked to complete the demand in 24 hours (George/Simons 1994: 27), while Bill Clinton eighty four years later granted six months of respite to the military leaders in Haiti in order to abdicate or face with invasion. (Paul n.d.: 13-14)

3.4 Motivation of the Parties

One thing is clear: the coercer must have a strong motivation to perceive the stakes and know where to step on the brakes in the crisis, while also be able to stay strong enough in order to give courage to national decision makers and make them venture the risks and costs of coercive diplomacy employment. In the final analysis, strength of motivation depends on the depth of the national interest which the key actors perceive

while taking decisions. (George/Simons 1994: 280-281) On the other hand, motivation elements do not only regard the coercer's strength of motivation. Instead, it is a "two-sided matter" (George/Simons 1994: 281). George (1991) underlines how the asymmetry of the motivation which shows the relative high motivation of the coercer in comparison with the coerced state, is crucial in determining the success. The relative motivation depends on what the magnitude of interests of the parties associate with the conflict, and how much they can venture in order to enforce their own interests. However, interest, as a concept, remains ambiguous in its definition and can be used by policy makers and analysts without an absolute clarity of it. The plurality of opinions regarding what the national interest is, then, makes it hard to have an analytical overview of such a critical concept. In this sense; Jakobsen makes a distinction between vital, strategic, stability and moral/ideological interests. In accordance with this distinction, vital interests which refer to the defense of homeland, and strategic interests which are about preserving an acceptable balance of power either global or regional, are the ones that increase the motivation of the threatening state. (Jakobsen 1998a: 35-36) In the cases where relative motivation of parties is not fixed by the nature of the conflict, coercer state might be able to create an asymmetry of motivation by using two ways. The first advice of George is limiting the demand so as not to penetrate any point of the adversaries' vital interest or secondly utilizing the ways of inducement by offering a carrot which reduces motivation of the adversary. As the recommended ways play a leverage role for lowering the opponent's motivation, lack of asymmetry in motivation of the parties is considered as an important reason causing failure. (George 1991: 77-78)

3.5 Complications Hardening to Measure Coercive Diplomacy Success

Since coercive diplomacy is a dynamic process, measuring the success of the strategy constitutes some other risks not only in terms of whether the employment of major elements is appropriate with the theory but also regarding more intricate outcomes which might occur during or at the end of the process. According to Jakobsen (2007) the first obstacle would be the coercer's acceptance of partial compliance or a reduction in the magnitude of the demand during the process which will throw him off the track of achievement. Secondly, even if there is success, when the inducements are involved in the process, it is always hard to differentiate whether the compliance is an outcome of sufficient coercion or it is caused by the profits as a result of

inducements given favoring the coerced state. Thus, the inducements should be sensitively and reasonably calculated. Third, since the term itself refers to an alternative to war, the only possible way for the strategy to conclude with 'cheap' success is a case where there is no use of force. If the coercive diplomacy employment includes limited use of force, it is counted as 'costly'. Furthermore, if the confrontation gets beyond the limits and turns into an escalation, it is seen as a 'failure'. The ideal scenario for Jakobsen, then, is the picture where the opponent complies with the demands meanwhile also being capable of organized resistance. The last but not the least factor, which also regards the EU more than any other, is the importance of differentiation between the success as tactical/temporary or strategic/lasting. In this sense, the analysis stated by Jakobsen regarding the historical success characteristics of the Western use of coercion shows that the majority of cases where the West has been involved as the coercer, have resulted in tactical/temporary success, which means that non-compliance of the target state often have been observed in new occurrences. (Jakobsen 2007: 30-31)

4. The Case of Iran

4.1 The Genesis of Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime and the EU

Resulted in loss or damage, WWII brought serious concerns along with its end in regards to nuclear weapons and their owners. The very reason that the nuclear materials could cause catastrophic scenes when they are in the wrong hands, urged specifically the big powers on creating mechanisms to control and supervise nuclear potentials of the countries. The first effort emerged with President Harry Truman's proposal of destroying all nuclear capital of the USA in exchange of other countries promise on not acquiring nuclear weapons and permissions over investigation. Following this attempt, President Dwight D. Eisenhower's "Atoms For Peace"¹³ speech in 1953 addressed to United Nations General Assembly paved the way of establishment of International Atomic Energy Agency. As a result, Eisenhower's calling, unlike

13 Through this historical speech, Eisenhower (1953) was claimed to aim creating an impact over United Nations in order to promote a global consensus for peaceful energy production by nuclear power. He was also accepted as seeking to put an end on the growing arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union while planning to redirect the resources toward domestic projects. (quoted in Lansford n.d.) For the whole document text of the speech see Eisenhower, Dwight D., 08 Dec. 1953: Atoms for Peace, in: The 470th Plenary Meeting of the United Nations General Assembly, URL: http://www.iaea.org/About/history_speech.html

Truman, for sharing nuclear materials and information for peaceful purposes with other countries through a new international agency founded provisions in return in 1957. A decade after, upon the debates on non-proliferation this time United Nations declared a resolution which forbids any new nuclear weapon creation following the establishment of Non-Proliferation Treaty. Therefore, by the Non-Proliferation Treaty foundation in 1968, the first steps based upon the rule of law and the commitment for states to a multilateral agreement in order to prevent nuclear proliferation were being taken by United States together with five nuclear weapon States. (Bunn 2003)

On the other side of the Atlantic, the early community of the European Union; Euratom was the first initiation of European countries to organize and control the nuclear issues which was founded in 1957. The treaty's major aim was "to establish the conditions for the development of nuclear energy in Europe by sharing resources (funds, knowledge, materials, experts etc.), protecting the general public and associating other countries and international organizations in this work." (Commission of the European Communities 2007) Yet, Euratom was not recognized as a mechanism covering nuclear non-proliferation matters, since it was mainly remaining as a regulatory body of nuclear technologies and resource management. (Kobia 2008: 39) For all intents and purposes, despite Euratom experience was useful to enhance other systems and practices, the real efforts on non-proliferation could only been embodied decades later. After initial steps towards a common external non-proliferation policy had been taken in 1980's, the first time for Europe to take the security issues into their agenda within an institutional setting was the year of 1981, when a Working Party on Non-Proliferation was established under the umbrella of European Political Cooperation.

Years later in 1990, this time under the name of European Committee, Dublin Declaration the first public high-level document on nuclear non-proliferation was ratified by 12 European countries. When French government's involved into Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1992 as the last EC member state, it was removed a major obstacle for European Union to realize a common stance. However, besides all these developments, the concrete attempt of the EU on the issue came into being in 2003. In this year Council of the European Union adopted the EU's Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction. By the late 2003 EU has articulated all its policies on weapons of mass destruction and has appointed a senior diplomat within the Council secretariat to inspect and supervise the regular WMD progress reports. This

appointment was also aimed to provide a mechanism which can actively engage in the diplomatic efforts and manage the controversies relating to Iran's nuclear programme. (Rynning 2007) These attempts can also be seen as the indicators for European Union has come long way on the issue of Weapons of Mass Destruction to become an international player. Indeed, in 2003 declaration, the responsibility of European Union as an "inevitable" global actor was obviously highlighted. (Barrinha 2010: 468) Furthermore, in 2008 Action Plan of EU in Combating the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (Council of the European Union 2008: 3), it is clearly stated that "Weapons of mass destruction which may be in the hands of states of concern or terrorists/non state actors constitute one of the greatest security challenges which European Union may ever face." Hence, by this declaration non-proliferation of WMD has been settled as the main element of Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU.

Since the initial attempts the framework of the Union's policies on non-proliferation is conceived together with two main factors. First of all, as it is well known that the end of the Cold-War has paved the way for an unprecedented strategic environment which has created new security challenges and also opportunities to develop new initiatives and policies. Indeed, even though the tensioned atmosphere between United States and Soviet Union dominating Cold-War era was over, with 1990-91 Gulf War brought out the questions around credibility of the existing agreements. (Van Ham 2010: 2) In addition to this unlike USA, the security of such materials remained from Soviet era nuclear installations have already become a perturbational matter for the EU after incidents of nuclear smuggling. The magnitude of the issue, by all means, has been summed up parallel to the internationalization of nuclear risks by the involvement of many other countries after Cold-War. The arguments over Iraqi nuclear program in 1991, those times' newly emerged nuclear weapon countries of India and Pakistan and in 2003 North Korea's withdrawal from Non Proliferation Treaty, in all, carried away the situation into an international issue. When trade in nuclear technology and know-how network organized by Pakistan discovered, nuclear black market became evident for the EU. What was more worrisome came into prominence with the rise of Al-Qaeda after 9/11 by calling to minds the conceivableness of nuclear terrorism. (Ellner 2009)

The second consolidation of the European Union into non-proliferation issues was the legal establishment of the Common Foreign and Security Policy in Maastricht Treaty

which maintains a concrete and common institutional framework to the Union on the matter. (Van Ham 2010: 2-3) In other words; it would have been unlikely to talk about a materialized approach about non-proliferation without any institutionalization like this. The initiations of European Security and Defense Policy, newly called Common Defense and Security Policy under CFSP, were first founded through The Nice (1999) and The Amsterdam (2003) Treaties which had provided for all EU institutions to strengthen their policies on more general issues like foreign and security matters. By this act first of all, it was delegated a direct role to the High Representative for CFSP, who the former was Javier Solana and the latter is Catherine Ashton. This agreement helped the member states to be able to start to work no longer dependent on the Commission whose responses were quite slow to the challenges in 1990's. (Ellner 2009: 85-86) Furthermore; the failure on finding a consensus during US-led Iraq War caused EU to be more aspired to have CFSP since according to some, the image of being a global power on security issues for EU was damaged after this discordance. Therefore, to be able to maintain a decisive and reliable image, founding a common basement for security and foreign issues has become inevitable for the Union. However, on the other hand, CFSP in the first place did not refer to the linkage between national defense and WMD and, thus, a questionable situation has occurred on the issues like regarding the nuclear arsenals of France and United Kingdom. Yet, even so, by Maastricht Treaty, a new CFSP chapter has been introduced covering a new instrument called joint actions, which provides to implement policy unanimously agreed among the member states. In addition to these, the European Parliament has started to engage with non-proliferation related resolutions and a plenitude of written and oral questions. (Van Ham 2010: 2-3) In the final picture the 27 Member States of the EU have all signed and ratified the 1968 NPT and the 1996 Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), and also they are members of the Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG) and the Zangger Committee and they all have an Additional Protocol with the IAEA in force. (Kobia 2008: 34)

4.2 The Evolution of the EU Engagement with Iran's Nuclear Programme

Before questioning necessities and justness of conflict-based characteristics of coercive diplomacy, preponderantly contradictions about the Iranian case turn mostly around the discursive configurations of both parties for both each other. As a matter of

course, this situation, eventually, affects the legitimacy of the demand in the case of Iran in the international community's eye. In this regard, a correct perusal of history can help with comprehending even the most intricate relations of states. For this reason, there has always been considerable interest among scholars in the field of Iranian history to analyze its relations with Europe. However, in conjunction with the raise of the Iranian nuclear issue, the literature has begun to witness some contradictions in the sense of relating historical backgrounds of two great powers and articulations towards each other with today's demands given to Iran. To give an example, the image of Iran in the eyes of Europeans has been stressed out by Santini and according to him Persia-Europe repugnance has been a fact for many years even going back to Ancient Greece. He exemplifies this statement by the words of Herodotus in his great book 'The Histories'. Herodotus differentiates Persians from Greek people by describing them as having an enormous wealth but a rambling army who were fighting against an antipodean characterized country which was poor and only had few but brave soldiers. In addition to this, he emphasizes that the term 'barbarian' was used for Persians in those times by portraying them as despots and unfamiliar with the idea of "polis".¹⁴ Indeed, unlike Ancient Greece which gives the roots of the Western democracy, according to Greeks in those times the Asians were ruled by tyrants, despots with absolute power, governing a hierarchical and rigid society, almost socially immobile, with an immense gap between the ruler and the ruled. (Santini 2010: 469)

Even though it is possible to take Santini's exemplifications as extreme and irrelevant, this set of thoughts are most probably still affecting people's minds when questioning possible psychological and implicit motivations of EU today. Indeed, as what Santini argues in summary, these depictions and representations of Iran since time immemorial have undoubtedly been influencing the attitudes of Western leaders and the media, causing ignorance on Iranians own justifications and understandings of the existing situation. This reached such a pitch that, in 2005 the former Speaker of the US House of Representatives was drawing some parallels between Iran and Nazi Germany, while the British historian, John Keegan (2006: 9), did not hesitate to say that the Ahmedinejad administration is far more dangerous than Saddam Hussein's,

¹⁴ "In his, 'The Histories', Herodotus formulated a more nuanced and complex appraisal of Persians acknowledging a set of virtues of Persians as people (among their moral principles, the love of truth, justice and generosity)." (Herodotus, quoted in Santini 2010: 469)

who was already portrayed as a more alarming person than Adolf Hitler by George Bush Snr. (Tarock 2006: 654) Bewildering as insulting speeches of political figures can be, it is more thought provoking to see people's astonished reactions when they learned some sociological statistics about Iran, like that Iran's literacy percentage is around %85.¹⁵ As this importance was pointed out, manipulated images created by using discursive techniques in not only the leaders but also in people's minds have an impact over the crisis. Retaining historical ties and case-specific stigmatizations can undoubtedly help in perceiving causes and causalities of steps taken today. However, to be able to make a correct perusal, matters in history should be plumbed in the most objective manner possible.

In the light of this information, let us return to the Iran's nuclear programme history. The foundations of the Iranian nuclear programme was laid around 1950's by the agency of United States of America as a part of the 'Atoms for Peace Programme'. In the following years, during Shah Pahlavi's rule, the Iranian nuclear programme made progress thanks to the encouragements and assistance of both USA and some Western countries, Germany and France. (Köse 2008: 22) In 1967 when the meetings were held together with Nixon administration, then continued with the Carter administration, Shah, in accordance with the newly created 'Atomic Energy Agency of Iran' decision, signed the agreement planning to develop at least eight nuclear power reactors in Busehr. Similarly, in 1974-76 France and Germany were solicitous to build respectively two pressurized water reactors and six more nuclear reactors in Iran. (Kibaroglu 2006: 215) As one of the biggest powers of the bipolar world order, the core motivation pushing United States into a relationship with Iran within the scope of building nuclear facilities must mainly be given to the Cold War dynamics and USA's intentions to keep Iran as an anti-Soviet bastion in the Middle East. (Santini 2010: 472) Tehran offered to buy USA's eight water reactors from General Electric and Westinghouse while the US government was in favor of Iran investing hundreds of millions of dollars in a US based uranium enrichment plant operated by Bechtel Corporation. (Burr 2009: 21) Needless to say, explanations given after the introduction of the programme was based on the idea of providing energy to Iran by nuclear power, hence, increasing Iran's oil export

¹⁵ Total adult literacy in Iran was %85 between the years 2007 and 2011. For more information about the statistical data for Iran see Unicef, Statistics, Iran Islamic Republic, URL: http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/iran_statistics.html

to USA and the West. It was also an argument that through sustaining required technology, American, German and French companies would be more included in investment processes of the construction of nuclear energy facilities in Iran, which could help the economies in these countries. Even though giving the materials and know-how to Iran could have caused a possible risk for Iran converting this reactor into a nuclear weapon, Western countries did not accentuate on this possibility.¹⁶ Therefore, together with the alliance with Shah, Western powers have a sigh of relief since they now could have staved off the possible Russian assistance to Iran on nuclear matters. This alliance though, only lasted until the Islamic Revolution in Iran. In the aftermath of the Revolution and then the hostage crisis, United States cut down all the economic and diplomatic ties with Iran, including nuclear cooperation. The following Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988), which started right after the revolution, led the Iranian nuclear programme into a deadlock, along with Khomeini's declarations remarking his unwillingness to continue any nuclear programme.¹⁷ On the other hand, in accordance with official acknowledgements of Iran, the establishment of the nuclear facilities in Busehr had already been brought to a certain level in the middle of the 1980's and even the war against Iraq had not caused any severe damage to the facilities. (Köse 2008: 20) Therefore as an expectable consequence of the emerging new world order at that time, in the 1990's Russia and China overtook the role of Western powers on assisting Iran in its nuclear programme. As a result, by the agency of Russian assistance, until the mid-1990's, Iran had completed all the building process of its nuclear reactor at the Gulf Port of Busehr (Santini 2010: 472-473), which could have been realized by initiative acts of US and West Germany in the 1970's if the cooperation would not have been halted because of the abovementioned reasons.

Back in time, while the complications in the Middle East was still ongoing and Iran was getting closer to complete its nuclear reactors day by day, on the other side of the world, Western countries were having long debates on the issue of non-proliferation. Along with some allegations about clandestine nuclear activities of Iraq and the

16 There is no evidence to claim that this possibility was ever considered by the West. Even, Shah wasn't asked to give guarantees or commitments both verbally or formally in order to put restrictions on his aspirations to produce only nuclear energy and not to make nuclear weapons later on. (Tarock 2006: 651)

17 Ayatollah Khomeini believed that Iran did not need nuclear energy. (Tarock 2006: 652) He also declared his ethical opposition to the idea of weapons of mass destruction by pronouncing a fatwa against the development, production, stockpiling and use of nuclear weapons like what the latter Supreme Leader Ayatollah Sayyid Ali Khamenei did in August 2005. (Santini 2010: 472)

emergence of 1990-1991 Gulf War, non-proliferation became and still is one of the major concerns of European Union agenda. After unpretentious attempts for establishing a non-proliferation framework in the beginning of 1990's, EU started to raise its voice primarily in the North Korean crisis. As now having a rightful word to say on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, 1990's was mainly the times for EU to put an emphasis on reinforcement of existing treaties and regimes by providing political and financial support to them. In a similar strategy as executed to Iraq or North Korea, EU applied the same mentality heeding multilateral approaches to security problems for other 'spoilsport' countries such as India and Pakistan. In this manner; right after the nuclear tests conducted by these two countries in 1998, the Union acted without any loss of time and through the medium of the United Nations Security Council, and started to urge New Delhi and Islamabad to follow the international non-proliferation and disarmament necessities.¹⁸ Yet, these declaratory policy attempts could not bring any success to the Union's aims, and neither India and Pakistan nor Iraq and North Korea did step back. (Bergenäs 2010: 497)

When we arrive at the beginning of the 21th century, we can observe that United States started to resign from its defender position on nuclear non-proliferation treaties. This alteration has paved the way for the European Union to be in a more active role in non-proliferation area and issues of weapons of mass destruction. The last indicator of this estrangement in that century was US Senate's refusal to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in 1999.¹⁹ With George Bush's administration coming into power, it was apparent that United States would not continue to give the same importance on multilateralism as previously. Indeed, United States did not stand back to declare a war against Iraq even though many European Union countries, except United Kingdom and a small number of mostly Eastern European countries, did not support this military venture. The war against Iraq, however, had a further significant meaning for international conjuncture; because meanwhile the debate on Iraq was going on, another non-proliferation issue was being raised across the border in Iran. Yet, this incident was not a surprise for European Union countries because despite the US

18 Right after the nuclear tests of India and Pakistan; the European Union presented a united front in the UN Security Council by condemning the atomic explosions in South Asia. The Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1172 which was aiming to urge India and Pakistan to become parties of the NPT and CTBT. (UNSC 1998)

19 For more information about the signatory countries see; Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty, n.d.: Member States, URL: <http://www.ctbto.org/member-states>

severance of relations with Iran, some EU countries, namely France and Germany, had already been sustaining their economic ties with Tehran. Such that, thanks to oil contracts made with French and German companies, the European Union was measured as Iran's largest trading partner in 1995. As a result of rapprochement policy, in 1998, the Comprehensive Dialogue was inaugurated with Iran. (Bergenäs 2010: 498-502) After several argumentations lasting for three years, in 2002, the first round table of the Trade and Cooperation Agreement could be held in Tehran. In addition to this initiation which provided observable improvements on protection of human rights in Iran, through this agreement the EU was also aiming at creating an oversight mechanism over Iran. Along with offering this agreement, the Union was demanding more economic and human rights reforms as well as a guarantee from Tehran to stay loyal to the elements of NPT. (Kaussler 2008: 271) In the same exact way as EU aimed while initiating the Comprehensive Dialogue, the rationales behind these cooperation initiations were touching upon to the Middle East peace process, WMD nonproliferation, human rights, terrorism, drug control, refugees, and also the potential for energy cooperation, the latter carrying the utmost importance for EU. (Bergenäs 2010: 501-502) Therefore, it was aimed to employ soft power tools such as creating an interdependence rather than confrontation and to encourage a reformist agenda triggering the interests of Iran whereas fulfilling EU's own. One could argue that, as a result of the following and snugly fitting occasions like the terrorist attacks on the 11th of September, the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars and the aforementioned non-stable stance of US towards non-proliferation, dealing with security issues has become complicated for EU. Batting around for sustaining good relations with the United States while aspiring to be a prominent global power whereas preserving the fundamental notions appertained to the Union and giving necessary responses to emergent threats did make the early 2000's hard and inwrought for the EU, especially in the work of establishing a comprehensive framework.

After several meetings and discussions in the West, along with such a lack of US willingness to be involved which are relative to several reasons, the three prominent European countries, Germany, France and United Kingdom, formed a group to start the official negotiations with Iran on nuclear issues. As trying not to make the same mistakes which they experienced through the disagreements that emerged in the Iraq case, EU was now willing to be precautionous this time about any possible escalation between USA and Iran. Forming a European group for negotiations, therefore, served

the EU to become a policemen proxy patrolling the Middle East meanwhile creating its own identity as an alternative for USA hegemony over the region. Therefore, towards the end of 2003, the expressive voice of the EU maintained by the Big Three got a new form by adding new mechanisms to the process. This was an outcome reasoned by some dissatisfactions raised in Brussels. It was argued that it is not fair for other European Union countries since they felt themselves excluded from the decision-making process on shaping a security framework towards Iran, while being affected by consequences of existing sanctions, so the negotiations were henceforth to proceed under the EU umbrella. (Santini 2010: 475) After the pressures put by Italy's and some small countries' officials', in 2004, Javier Solana, who was the EU High Representative for the Common Security and Foreign Policy at the time, participated in the process of leading the talks between EU and Iran. (Dupont 2009: 100) As a result, the so called never-ending story diversified by words like consent, interest, right, risk, possibility, sanction or threat which are being interjected by both sides, officially started. Meanwhile, with the official kick-off of negotiations, efforts spent on TCA and Comprehensive Dialogue between European Union and Iran was suspended on account of the fact that the reform process on such issues as human rights, WMD policies and terrorism had not been carried any further by Iran. Throughout the diplomatic history of Iran and EU which is characterized by stumbling blocks, the results of the multi-track strategy of the EU aiming at improvement of respect to human rights which was supported by both politicians and human rights activists was, undoubtedly, one of the most important constructive attempts. However, the chance of promoting relations needed to be forfeited as a consequence of impoundment. Surely, one of the reasons behind this suspension was the increased suspicions over Iran's clandestine nuclear facilities. In consequence, the relational status between Iran and EU and the core element of the engagement has been merged into a negotiation process in which EU is demanding Iran to stop certain nuclear activities. This sudden shift of the Union in issues ranging from increasing developmental level of the country to implementing strict sanctions over the country was officially an outcome followed by an International Atomic Energy Agency declaration which accuses Iran of failing to meet its NPT obligations since it has not properly given reports on its processing activities. Technical investigations of IAEA observers were claiming that mandatory requirements for having a nuclear weapon based on uranium enrichment capability and producing plutonium have been fulfilled by Iran. A consequential official report of the IAEA

conducted on January 2003 exactly declared that "Iran has failed to meet its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement with respect to the reporting of nuclear material, the subsequent processing and use of that material and the declaration of facilities where the material was stored and processed."(IAEA 2003: 7-8)

Despite there were and there still are ambiguous points in the situation, an official announcement coming from IAEA has, no wonder, led to different comments over the issue. In media and literature many authors supported the beliefs of the international community, saying that Iran has intentions to make a nuclear weapon rather than solely providing electricity by its programme. (Santini 2010: 471-472) This argument is undergirded by certain indicators showing that the negotiations were deteriorated by Iran since it continued some of its activities which the IAEA regarded as suspicious. Additionally; the postponements of the IAEA observers' visits to the country or Iran's impatient attitude about calling IAEA to snatch its job and even threatening the other countries with reducing its cooperation agreements, all proved that Iran has some clear intentions which can hardly be considered as innocent. This argument, indeed, is declared even by the IAEA itself, by saying that taking into consideration the violations of its non-proliferation commitments, Iran have had a clandestine fissile material production program for nearly 18 years and it is still taking further steps in its enrichment programme. (Einhorn 2004: 22)

As a result of the E3/EU negotiation initiations, a couple of months later, on the 18th December of 2003, Iran committed itself to the Additional Protocol of IAEA, a protocol agreed upon by the IAEA Board of Governors in 1997.²⁰ With this agreement Tehran was affirming further inspections to all its nuclear installations in anytime, in anywhere. Thus, EU was successful on its shuttle diplomacy in order to build bridge between Washington and Tehran. (Santini 2010: 474-475) Towards the end of November 2004, diplomatic threats by the EU, thereby putting sanctions over Iran, made these two parties one step closer to each other and they signed the Paris Agreement. The agreement was prescribing Iran to continue temporary suspension of all enrichment and reprocessing activities including the manufacture installation, testing and operation centrifuges, in order to find a mutual beneficial solution during

²⁰ Additional Protocol is a legal document confirming the IAEA complementary inspection authority to strengthen the classical safeguard agreements.

the negotiation process. (Rynning 2007: 279) Furthermore, the Paris meetings gave the opportunity for refreshing the parties' relations and even relaunching cooperative activities with Iran under TCA was revived by Solana (2004) himself. On the one side in its Presidency Conclusions such incentives, albeit without details, were offered by the Council to Iran as cooperation on areas of trade and technology exchange. However, EU defended its dignity and indicated that EU was still expecting Tehran to keep building the confidence vis-a-vis the international community. (Council of the European Union n.d.) 2004 was significant with Iran's amendment of its previous declarations. Upon IAEA's call on Iran to be more cooperative and to answer all of the questions about the origins of its centrifuge technology, it accepted that by the agency of foreign intermediary it had imported P-1 centrifuges in 1987 and p-2 centrifuge drawings in 1994. At about the same time a confidential United Nations document was leaked out to the media, saying that they had not found any trace for nuclear weapons so far in Iran, but they still needed more ascertainment. (Köse 2008: 22) A couple of months later in May 2005, through several meetings with Iranian officials, EU-3, offered a comprehensive long term agreement. EU-3 was meanwhile trying to take diplomatic steps to convince the Bush administration to offer some economic incentives. Despite of cautious approach of USA saying that the only acceptable "objective guarantee" would be the total cessation of enrichment in Iran (Kasm 2008: 23), in March 2005, EU-3's trials came to fruition by USA dropping its rejection to Iran's application to the World Trade Organization. However, a short while after, when the "Framework for a Long-term Agreement" was officially presented by the EU-3 in August 2005, Iran chose to reject of the agreement. The reason behind this rejection was explained with saying that the proposal was heavy on demands but light on incentives. (The Nuclear Threat Initiative, n.d.) It was also another outcome of the 2005 Iranian elections, which led the country to ultra-conservatism under Mahmoud Ahmadinejad administration, that Iran took a hardline anti-U.S., anti-Israeli approach and also since from the beginning took his stand on Iran's right to have a nuclear fuel cycle, where including enrichment and reprocessing. (Kasm 2008: 23) Thus, so to say, 2005 was the year when the diplomatic progress between Iran and EU broke down. (The Nuclear Threat Initiative, n.d.) The process had already been run and still continued running in a wobbly way. In February 2006, Tehran infringed its voluntary implementation of the Additional Protocol, and the enrichment processes in Natanz were resumed. As a reaction towards Iran's reversal of the situation, in March through

the IAEA Board of Governors report, United Nations Security Council called Iran to stop his violations of his obligations and to cooperate with the IAEA. However, Iran's response to these warnings coming from both UN and EU3 together with USA, Russia and China, was negligently. The first reference regarding Iran's response was Ahmedinejad's letter to Bush in which accusations towards USA for creating chaos in the world was the dominant mentioned issue. Then, Iran started its threats on breaking away its bonds with IAEA and upgrading its program from research&development to industrial level. (Sauer 2007: 12)

As a result of iterative defiance of Iran against all compromise steps like EU's offering assistance for civilian nuclear technology, the format of negotiations was elevated and, despite Russia's initial reluctance (Tarock 2006: 649), United States, Russia and China were added to the negotiations naming the process afterwards as EU3+3.²¹ Hence, by the virtue of the organic inclusion of UNSC's prominent countries into the process, in July 2006 the Resolution 1696 passed unanimously. According to this declaration Iran is asked to suspend enrichment activities until the 31th of August 2006. However, not even a resolution unanimously accepted could hamper Iran to continue its operations of enrichment facilities and even inaugurating a heavy water production plant in Arak. In consequence of Iran's failure to meet the demands promptly and satisfactorily, UN Security Council Resolution 1737 was released. The critical point of this decision was that for the first time limited economic sanctions over Iran mandating all UN members were agreed, i.e. banning the international export or transfer of nuclear and missile technologies, materials, equipment, and goods which could have any contribution to Iran's enrichment, reprocessing or heavy water related activities or the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems to Iran, (UN Committees n.d.) freezing the foreign assets of twelve individuals and ten organizations involved with the Iranian nuclear program. (The Nuclear Threat Initiative, n.d.) However, it is apparent that since the negotiators' format was elevated to P5+1, the dissidences, not only caused by USA's persistence to strengthen the sanctions over Iran, but also Russia's and China's concerns about Iran's population being possible and unfortunate target of the sanctions, have been tousing the course. (Kasm 2008: 23-24)

21 The other name to call E3+3 is P5+1 which refers to permanent members of UN Security Council+ Germany. The term "P5+1" is criticized by its reference to shift the emphasis of negotiators from Europe to more international context.

The enlargement in the team of negotiators through the backup from Russia, China and USA, indeed, came in useful for the EU trying to provide to a certain extend cohesion among its own member states. (Posch 2007: 538) On the other hand, the cohesion endeavours of the EU, however, even though the majority seemed convinced by the IAEA declaration, were spoiled by some countries. For instance, Germany was not completely sure about Iran's fulfilled intentions to acquire nuclear weapons. In other words, they did hardly believe that Iran had already decided to have weapons, even if it has had fissile material production. According to Germany, the capability of having improved nuclear technology might have been used by Iran as sending a signal to the world that it would be able to produce nuclear weapons in a short period of time. This reason, which can be understood as a disturbance in coherence, together with its other problematic disagreements, generated a disadvantage for the EU on constituting its motivation towards applying coercive diplomacy over the subject of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The level of nuclear facilities in Iran, and whether they are operational or not, is still standing as an ambiguous issue. However, conducted reports were showing that they have been under construction since 2005 and they should have been functional by 2006. (Schmidt 2008: 29) Since the procedures to be followed for the completion of a nuclear weapon are quite similar with producing nuclear energy which means using nuclear for civilian purposes, the dilemma is that there is no way to abolish risks of proliferation of nuclear weapons without eliminating all nuclear technology in the world.²²

4.3 Implementation of the Coercive Diplomacy Theory into the Case of Iran

4.3.1 Contextual Variables of the Case of Iran

Many contextual factors differ from one situation to another. Based upon Aleander George's emphasis, the duty of the policy maker is to judge the variants and sort the context-variables particular to the situation while implementing the theory into practice since all these variables could be influential on both the implementation and the outcome. (George/Simons 1994: 20) Given that, as every crisis in the world, the

22 The necessary components for production of nuclear weapons like know-how, non-nuclear materials, etc. are available in international markets except one technical element which is highly enriched plutonium or uranium. However, this last very important element is possible to be acquired for countries through their existing nuclear reactors or research facilities. (Taylor 1988: 1-2)

Iranian nuclear issue has its own special characteristics which are contingent. Having said that; in order to have grip over what conditions evolved around the EU's employment of the strategy and how they affect the way through the desired result. Among the set of contextual factors offered by George, the first pertinent title worthy to analyse is the isolation of the adversary. If the coerced state is not isolated and supported by diplomatically and militarily, then it becomes difficult for the defenders to employ their political responsibility properly. As highlighted in an IAEA report conducted in 2004, 13 meetings were held between Iranian officials and an unknown supply network. This supply ring was believed to be Pakistani A.Q Khan network and this situation constituted a serious concern. (Zarif 2009) On the other hand, considering the attitude of the Non-Aligned Movements which constitutes 118 states which are described as not to align with or against any major power bloc, it becomes hard to say that Iran is an isolated country. Although there are some refractory countries in the group, the vast majority of the NAM is seemed to support nuclear fuel-cycle related activities of Iran. Evident from the statement adopted in 2008 at the 15th Ministerial Conference of NAM, the group calls the international powers for the respect to "the basic and inalienable right of all states to develop research, production and use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes" and the respect of "[s]tates' choices and decisions, including those of the Islamic Republic of Iran, in the field of peaceful use of nuclear technology and its fuel cycle policies". (Non-Aligned Movement 2006) Furthermore, with the last meeting held in Tehran in 2012's August, it became apparent that isolation policies over Iran are far from being successful. Thus, especially USA attempts towards isolating Iran, for instance by putting pressure on the EU in 2010 to impose sanctions framed on the US unilateral legislation in order to widen the isolation of Iran (Tabrizi/Santini 2012: 2), have hardly be seen as successful. As it was not helpful to change Saddam Hussein's behaviour or to impair Cuba's or North Korea's resistance, in today's world states' containment trials by applying sanctions or economic mechanisms or policies of restriction are being questioned upon their effectiveness. (Los Angeles Times 2012)

Another issue which, undoubtedly, creates concerns for both the international community and the EU is Russian and Chinese attitudes towards putting further sanctions, stated on the reason that any additional measures possibly provoke the discontent over Iranian population. (BBC 2012) Despite the fact that Russia-Iran relations have seemed unpredictable for international actors over the past two

decades, Russia's reluctance to put sanctions over Iran, together with China's role as an important trade partner with Iran for so long, create clear disparities between the USA-France-UK front and the Russia-China front. Arguably Russia's positioning in UNSC has been seen as a reaction against the long-standing hegemony of USA. (Simpson 2010) On the one hand Russia persistently gives its support to the activities of such international bodies as the UN and IAEA, however, on the other hand seems reluctant to take unilateral sanctions against Iran and isolate it from international political and economic organizations. To reach an ultimate comprehensive agreement by means of the negotiations with Iran is an important motivation for Russia. (CNN World 2012) However, Russia's tactical but not strategic decisions towards Iran together with China's veto preventing UN to take an integrated multinational stance against Iran, thus, is prejudicial over the EU's aims of coercive diplomacy.

Coercive diplomacy employment becomes harder, as is seen in the case of Iran, when there is a coalition of states rather than a single actor. Even though there can be found a consensus in specific elements of the strategy, it is still expected for coalitional coercive diplomacy to be risky because those states might not agree on which ways are the best for the achievement or even sometimes on the goal itself.²³ In an application of coalitional coercive diplomacy rather than unilateral, the unity and sense of purpose, with George's terms, can be fragile, although a coalition could be helpful in bringing international pressure, thus, more credibility for the strategy. (George 1991: 70) Therefore, although the issue has already been elevated to a broader coalitional level with the participation of the United Nations' other permanent members than E3, and there still is comprehensive UN economic and financial sanctions through four UNSC resolutions imposed, Iran has still been persistent on not complying with the demands, according to different authors; because of separate financial EU sanctions and the unilateral US economic and financial sanctions against it. Nor is this all, EU is also also being criticized for losing its credibility as an independent player and appropriate negotiator by giving support to the US and UNSC sanctions which were decided in as a result EU's failure on finding a solution for the problem. (Sonboli 2011) Indeed besides the international multi-headedness of the strategies, even for EU itself

23 Such like in 1990's how the coalition against Iraq started to be retrogressing as the impacts of sanctions took the turn for the worse for coalition member states. (Art 2003: 367-368)

where 27 states are involved into decision making processes, it is particularly difficult to employ successful coercive diplomacy. (Hyde-Price 2008: 33)

4.3.2 Conflict-Based Conditions Favoring the Success of the European Union

4.3.2.1 The Demand Elements

On the way of its engagement with Iran, initial EU demands can easily be regarded as clear and specific. The EU chose to act together with international institutions embodying effective multilateralism which was emphasized by Solana himself. Respectively with historical timeline what EU demanded from Iran are 1) "a binding commitment not to pursue fuel cycle activities other than the construction and operation of light water power and research reactors." which includes no uranium conversion, or enrichment, no fuel reprocessing and the closure of the heavy water reactor at Arak. It is also clearly stated by the EU3 that the major facilities executed in Natanz and Isfahan are expected to be shut down. In exchange for the loss of a substantial capital investment, EU promised to establish a group which can work on alternative uses of the materials and facilities. 2) Iran had to provide necessary information for all questions raised under his Safeguard Agreement and Additional Protocol and stay in cooperation with IAEA under all circumstances. 3) Iran had to ratify the NPT Additional Protocol by the end of 2005 while implementing it comprehensively. 4) Iran had to accept the regulations of the supply of nuclear fuel elements from outside and arrangements after their use in the reactor in order to return them to the supplier. 5) Through the assistance of EU officials to set up procedures, Iran had to concur with the strict national export controls constituted by UNSCR 1540 which are based upon international norms. 6) Iran had to provide a legally-binding commitment for not leaving the NPT. (Ingram 2005: 3) During the time period of negotiations, at certain intervals, these demands are also being repeated by UNSC many times. In the latest UN Security Council Resolution the article 1929 affirmed one more time that Iran is required "to cooperate fully with the IAEA on all outstanding issues, particularly those which give rise to concerns about the possible military dimensions of the Iranian nuclear programme;....without delay, comply fully and without qualification with its Safeguards Agreement ;to act strictly in accordance with the provisions of its Additional Protocol, ratify it promptly, suspend all reprocessing, heavy water-related and enrichment-related activities'. (IAEA 2012)

European Union's underlying objective of its demands from Iran implies to prevent Iran from being a nuclear weapon state in basic terms. Indeed, as opposed to Kenneth Waltz's (1995) argument saying that with more nuclear states the world will have a promising future, increase in proliferation of nuclear weapons is commonly believed as something undermining international stability and heightening this risk of a nuclear war probably caused by miscalculation, misperception or accident. Should any state start to think that an increase in its nuclear arsenal would not have any great impact on the international stability, other states might also start to think in the same way, and thus end in chaos. NPT, with its 189 signatories gives the legal base for civilian use of nuclear power to these countries if and only if they stay loyal to safeguard protocols stated and administered by the IAEA. In this manner, one of the major aims of this agreement is to prevent any leak in concertedness and code of good practice and making sure that every state stays non-nuclear in accordance with common good. This providence of synchronization and stability in international arena is a function of states' feelings of confidence that the NPT continues to be effective. (Müller 2005: 36) Correlatively prominent that, discussions about the NPT is penetrating whether the underlying object of the European Union's demands which is preventing Iran to be a nuclear weapon state is legitimate or not.

Back in previous chapters, including the sources and problematic points, the legitimacy of the international law which backs up the demand's legitimacy is briefly discussed. In conjunction with what was stated, in actual international relations, the fact is that international law has been propounded by many presidents in order to legitimize their military authorization and coercive acts. According to Dr. Schwarzenberger (1951); "In a society in which power is the overriding consideration, it is the primary function of laws to assist in maintaining the supremacy of force and the hierarchies established on the basis of power and to lend to such system the respectability and sanctity of law. In a variety of ways, international law serves these purposes." (McDougal 1953: 199) The same situation is visible for the EU whose legitimacy of the objective in its demand from Iran is formed on the basis of the Non-Proliferation Treaty elements and

International Atomic Energy Agency declarations which are accepted as the main creators of non-proliferation discourse and norms together in the international arena.²⁴

The outset and the content of NPT were well-settled and regarded qualitatively and symbolically as a huge success. (Leventhal 1985: 12) However, the existing regime, whose rules are settled by NPT, is being severely criticized because of exact legitimacy problems that multilateral agreements are likely to encounter. Two important reasons are presented for the facts challenging NPT's validity. The first reason, in this regard, is violation of "estoppel principle" by some countries. In accordance with this principle, a state cannot demand from another state what it itself does not recognize through breaking the law. (Bock 2009) For NPT, in fact, questions turning around its ninth Article which gives the right to five already nuclear weapon States to acquire their nuclear weapons has long been subject to many criticisms. Furthermore, such stimulative questions like if strategically secure countries such as United Kingdom and France want nuclear missiles as an ultimate line of defense, why not Iran and North Korea would not desire the same, are still continuing to be raised. (Jenkins 2006) As the second reason challenging NPT's reliability, its departure from being reciprocal and equal in practice creates problems for the agreement. Equality and reciprocity means an equal treatment to every signatory state while if there is an exceptional case, these exceptions should be applicable to every member under the same circumstances. Therefore, it is expected from already nuclear-weapon states to disarm and to reconsider their relations with all other states like India or Israel if these states do not stop and disclose their nuclear weapons programs. (Bock 2009: 4-5) However, similar to what has been observed in Iranian case it is not always easy for NPT to operate IAEA's control and supervision mechanisms. Due to contextual weaknesses of NPT, if a country does not already bind itself to safeguard agreements, then it becomes possible for that country to elude controls of his nuclear facilities because the law pays attention to already declared agreements.

Particularly for middle-powers among the signatories, these problematic parts in NPT encapsulating discrimination and inequality have so long been an unpleasant issue. Besides its being a global issue, for European Union countries the reliability problem

24 Together with these institutions, Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, UN Conference on Disarmament or export-control regimes such as Nuclear Suppliers Group and Zangger Committee can be counted as the constitutors of nuclear non-proliferation regime.

has also had the risk implementation of cohesive WMD policies for the EU. Indeed, seeing such debates among nuclear weapon States and non-nuclear weapon States, it becomes evident that the theoretical reliability of some important NPT articles has been under severe crisis which might lead to “debilitation and risk of collapse” as pointed out by Sergio Duarte (2008), former High Representative for Disarmament Affairs United Nations. Critics of non-nuclear weapon states in European Union concentrating on especially United Kingdom and France for not doing enough in order to eliminate their nuclear arsenals have every so often been brought to the table in different occasions. For France and UK it is possible to say that they choose to be accord with the idea of nuclear weapons are ‘essential to preserve peace’ which is one significant NATO principle. (Tocha 2009: 11) This, however, criticized, for instance, in the meetings held in 2004, in which Sweden, Greece and Finland was pointing out the equation that if nuclear weapon States do not make any progress on disarmament, then taking a tougher stance on Iran would not be credible enough. (Sauer 2012: 15) In another meeting, in the Review Conference held in New York in 2005, once after the nuclear weapon states claimed more commitment to non-proliferation, non-nuclear and non-aligned States were laying weight on the necessity of being loyal to the Article VI of the NPT enacting disarmament of the nuclear arsenals owned by the five founder states of the agreement and Article III and IV which underline each member States’ right to peaceful use of nuclear energy and developing a domestic enrichment capability for civilian aims. (Müller 2005) However, it is hard to say that including this vindicator attitude of non-nuclear States, the general compliance with their NPT obligations do stem from their belief in non-nuclear rules and norms or global nuclear governance. Instead, the regime survives because it is easy for the countries to be in rapport with the agreement, and few leaders have really wanted to acquire what NPT prohibits. (Hymans 2006: 8)

Considering the existing situation, after perennial negotiation process Iran is still unwilling to comply with EU’s demands. This is also because Iran’s fear of facing with more demands if he would accomplish the initial ones. The possible extension of the EU and USA demands scaring Iran could be in a range from cutting down the support to terrorist organizations to recognition of Israel, even further to a regime change in Iran. (Sauer 2007: 21-22) Indeed, President Ahmadinejad himself also brings these concerns to the table in his speeches as in one he says; “If you give in on nuclear

weapons program, they'll ask about human rights. If you give in on human rights, they'll ask about animal rights." (Takeyh n.d., quoted in Gwertzman 2006)

4.3.2.2 The Threat Elements

As stated by Cavelti and Mauer (2010, quoted in Santini 2010: 474), the threat of sanctions was more powerful than the employment of threats according to the European view. However this attitude kept its survival up until 2006, imposing sanctions, because of Iran's insistent defiance to the efforts of the EU in order to find a resolution for its nuclear programme. Even though the EU had endorsed sanctions against the countries supporting terrorism like Syria and Libya in 1990's and some other countries like Burma, Nigeria or Zimbabwe in which there are serious human rights violations and obstruction of the democratic process (Portela 2005: 102), 2006 was the first time for the EU to impose sanctions against a country in the sense of weapons of mass destruction issues. Since 2006 EU has been implementing all United Nations Security Council Resolutions over Iran including restrictive measures against officials and organizations related to the nuclear program, while in 2010 chose to use punitive measures beyond UNSC and since then espousing a tougher stance against Iran with its own comprehensive sanctions. Trusting upon the so far EU-Iran relations in the economic field, this shift was more about the enforcement of USA to EU in order to impose sanctions framed on the US unilateral legislation called CISADA. Thus, this shift could be seen as a success of the American coercive approach because USA then managed to isolate Iran by enlarging sanctions from US and UN further to EU. (Tabrizi/Santini 2012: 2)

However, as aforementioned, the EU has traditionally been skeptical about implying a purely coercive approach. This is because economic sanctions have been seen as a dangerous and risky tool in the sense of being ambiguous of whether or not they can bring the desired success to the EU. Economic sanctions have generally been seen as the tools which might harm EU's own interests. (Tabrizi/Santini 2012: 6) Indeed, economic sanctions are the center of many debates among scholars in the sense of whether or not they affect the right targets. In the long run, it is believed that sanctions, even if they are relatively modest, have an impairing effect over the middle class by reason of destroying their economic and social foundations. A wrecked middle class, on the other hand, is perhaps the most inimical thing to do for Iran since this class' people could be the only leverage in the way of carrying Iran forward to a more

democratic and more humane country. (Posch 2007: 540) Moreover, economic sanctions constitute a danger not only for people in Iran or European countries but for many other people all over the world. Specifically after the approval of a new set of sanctions against Iran which has been de facto imposing an oil embargo on the 23rd of January 2012²⁵, sanctions' credibility and generative effects to the international energy market has become a big issue. Among the set of concerns, one scenario is about sanctions' leading role in the increase in Chinese market exchanges. In this regard; already established trade agreements that make China the third largest oil client of Iran might serve China, and in case China will buy Iranian oil by using non-convertible Yuan, it would lead Iran to use those money in the Chinese market which will eventually hurt European and some other economies. Another point regards the other powerful actor, Russia, as one of the world's largest oil producer, pumping 10 million barrels a day and exporting 7 million a day, mostly to Europe and Asia. (Tabrizi/Santini 2012: 5) Russia has already been known as beneficiary of sanctions over Iran, even in an incremental manner by dint of the escalation. This is because the higher prices of oil mean higher revenues for Russia because they increase its energy revenues.²⁶ Therefore, economic sanctions which could be seen as a result of lack of solution for the ongoing crisis, is likely to create beneficiaries for others than the European Union itself. Furthermore, protracting its approach towards Iran by putting prominent higher costly oil sanctions, the effort of creating a fear of escalation on the Iranian side seems unlikely to get ahead since cutting oil had already been on Iran's threats' agenda and even actualized as a preemptive retaliation before EU sanctions on oil took effect. For instance, Iran halted oil exports to Germany recently, a day after it stopped crude exports to Spain and Greece (Spiegel Online International 2012), while Iranian officials keep declaring that it is easy for Iran to offset an EU ban by simply shifting the exports to Asian countries. (Der Spiegel 2012) Indeed, the later declarations of Beijing which was criticizing unilateral sanctions imposed by USA and EU and emphasizing China's

25 In the EU meeting held on the 23rd of January 2012, an embargo has been put on daily 600,000 barrels capacity of the EU's oil export from Iran and as replacement of Iranian oil such alternative countries like Saudi Arabia have been decided to buy oil from. (Katzman 2012: 32-33)

26 According to the analysis' estimation due to the tense environment caused by Iran problem, \$5 to \$15 a barrel has been added to the global price of oil. These numbers mean an extra \$35 million to \$105 million a day for the Russian industry. The windfall provided from the taxes of those sales served for Russian government in the areas like subsidizing domestic energy consumption, fighting against inflation, etc. (Kramer 2012)

desire to act with deliberation on Iran's issue, were more like suiting Iran's advantage on challenging the West. (The Telegraph 2012)

On the one hand, the confrontational strategic steps taken by some nuclear powers which prolong the possibility of finding a solution, on the other hand the disadvantages of the deadlock in the negotiations enmesh the EU in a double-edged situation. The problem on the one side is that both USA and Israeli governments give clear threats to a possible military strike, a threat which was also supported by French President Sarkozy and the French Minister of Foreign Affairs Kouchner, if Iran will not suspend its uranium enrichment program. On the other side EU is persistent on focusing on diplomatic solutions as long as possible. (Tocha 2009: 18) However, besides the fact that these multifaceted efforts turn to EU as mainly economic losses, the most dramatic disadvantage for the strategy can be that the threats of the EU (which are already seen as the legitimacy in their underlying objective is moot) started to lose their credibility. Since the regional intricacy would not likely to allow USA, Israel or any other power to wage a war with Iran, especially in the Middle East this kind of intimidation attempts are not seen as realistic. Briefly, Iran's dominancy over such terrorist organizations in Middle East as Hamas or Hezbollah can lead it to cooperate with them against any attack. Moreover, already known intermediate ballistic missiles of Iran can be navigated towards Israel in any hazardous incident. (Sauer 2007: 22) What could be more critical among the possible occurrences is the realization of already ongoing menace of Ahmedinejad on closing the Strait of Hormuz where 17 million barrels of oil pass through every day. (Blair 2012) Therefore, fear of escalation which in reference to the theory can make the success easier, is not an appropriate mean that can be used in the case of Iran. The reason of this argument might also be explained by another context-variable indicated by George (1991: 70), the image of war, which claims "the more horrible the image of war the crisis triggers, the more strongly motivated one or both sides will be to operate with restraint and to cooperate to avoid such a war." Moreover, since the regional tenderness and intricate relations of numerous actors existing or involved in the Middle East are not only analyzed by Western strategists but also are reckoned among Iranian experts. In this regard an image of war becomes a "don't" for all the other actors while for Iran it remains as an ensurer of self-confidence.

Particularly when the reputation of the EU become a part of the analysis, it is hard to argue that EU has a reputation of being a threatener. As how Einhorn (2004: 28-29) categorized EU's and USA's innate roles over Iran, as good cop and bad cop respectively, EU is rather famous with its discretion of using mainly soft power tools or being considered as a civilian power even though EU's being a civilian power is seen as only possible owing to NATO and US backups. (Hyde-Price 2004: 5) On the other hand, even though USA, as the only actor who might have a reputation of using credible threats or further using force, is also playing a critical role on the sanctions applied over Iran, the picture is not that easy for USA either. More and more the conditions in Iraq and Afghanistan have been deteriorated; USA's credibility has been disrepute which would prevent it from taking new intervention decisions. By the same token, both the international public support, and the enthusiasm among the population of USA, for any further military intervention have been dampened. In US surveys conducted to show public support for a military intervention against Iran was 50% in April 2003 while this number decreased to 10%-20% in other researches done between February 2006 and November 2011. (Pollingreport n.d.) This ebbing in public support has undoubtedly created an admonitory impact over USA, to act cautiously. Yet, this very reason causing a change in USA approaches, became the very reason for Tehran not to have any fear for the threats coming from Washington. (Davies 2012: 317)

Notwithstanding, the reputation of the threatening party is in fact not only a qualifier input for making the strategy effective, but its reflexion is even bigger as an outcome of how the strategy is employed in time. In other words; as what Jakobsen (1998a: 1) asserts, although coercive diplomacy is a low-cost strategy if it succeeds, it is very costly for the coercer if it fails since he then has to make a choice between backing down or executing his threats, which the latter is in some cases more costly for the coercer than a situation where even the coerced state acts completely against the demand. Therefore, for the EU as an institution lacking military means and relying on economic and diplomatic instruments, the more time passing with no solution found and

Iran resisting on not compromising with the EU, the bigger risk for the EU to be infamised.

4.3.2.3 Time Limit

It has already been stated that an ultimatum or a tacit ultimatum case consists of a deadline or at least a sense of urgency given by the coercer. In this manner Iran has also met with settled deadlines coming from the international community. Ranging from i.e. the early October 2006 deadline given by the P5+1 countries (Kessler 2006), the deadline set by the US President Barack Obama at the 35th G8 Summit held in July 2009 which was giving time to Iran till September 2009 to make some improvements or 'face with consequences' (Daily Times 2009), to IAEA Chief Muhammed ElBaradei's 2 days limit for Iran to comport with the draft agreement prepared by him²⁷.

However, considering the existing impassed situation of the negotiations, even though different parties have given several deadlines to Iran in this process in order to make him agreed with the terms cited in demands, it is apperant that none of them could manage to dissuade Iran. The reason behind the repetitive failures of the deadlines is the credibility problem of the deadlines given. Precisely such was the case in the 2006 deadline which was the fourth deadline given in a four months period, and which was originally set for the end of June after P5+1's incentive offers to Iran on the 1st of June, but then was postponed to the end of July and at last was decided as the end of August by the UNSC Resolution, where the coalitional structure caused difficulties to set an exact time and to be more decisive for the EU. (Kessler 2006) As the result, Iran complied with respectively none of the deadlines put for the end of October 2004 and 2006, the beginning of March 2006, the end of April 2006, mid-July 2006 and the end of August 2006 (Sauer 2007: 24) which are passed over without any severe consequences for Iran.

4.3.2.4 Motivation of the Parties

The coercive diplomacy theory points to the necessity for the coercer party, first and foremost, to have a strong motivation on reaching the desired result whilst to generate an asymmetry of motivation by reducing the opponent's motivation. In this regard; it is crucial to understand why or for what reasons Iran and the EU attached themselves to this confrontation, while it is also consequential to scrutinize what lies behind the

27 In his draft Baradei offered Iran "putting 1,200 kg. of Iran's low-enriched uranium from the stockpile it has been accumulating at its main enrichment plant in Natanz into the custody of the IAEA, the UN's watchdog, by the end of the year." (Alvi 2010: 108)

Big Three's (France, Germany and United Kingdom) relevant or irrelevant motivations with the EU's general motivations.

Although there is still no evidence or 'smoking gun' found, proving that Iran has actual nuclear weapons, speculations turning around Iran's intentions brings to people's minds that the odds of Iran having the motivation to be a nuclear power. Indeed, as stated by an Iranian scholar and diplomat "Iran wants to join the nuclear club." (Afrasiabi/Kibaroğlu 2005: 225) Considering Iran's defiance so far, if we assume that Iran really wants nuclear weapons, then the questions occurs for why Iran wants nuclear weapons? Among the several reasons given to this question in the literature, the most factual one, beyond any doubt, is that Iran has legitimate security concerns as a country, being located in an important geo-strategic point. Alone the presence of scarce resources, oil and gas, in considerable amounts, is, beyond every other hostility that might create, so to say, paranoia for Iran, an adequate reason to make the region a flustered insecure area. On the other hand, there are considerable explanations, sought by empathetic observers, concerning historical triggering points for Iran's ambitions, such as American interventions and enhanced presence of America in the region after operations in and around the Gulf; like in Saudi Arabia or in Oman, old confrontation with Iraq in which Iran faced with attacks of chemical weapons, and far worse still: the present "tough nuclear neighbourhood" surrounding Iran which includes Russia, China, India, Pakistan and Israel. (Chubin 2008: 49 / Sauer 2007: 24-25) These entrenched security problems can be regarded as the main reason why Iran might see nuclear capability as an influential deterrent against possible threats.

Another reason for Iran's motivation could be its ambitions in being a regional power in the Middle East and protecting its prestige. With its high population and rich culture going back to ancient times, for Iran to have a regional and international prestige can easily be argued as crucial. Indeed, acquisition of nuclear weapons is seen as a symbol for Iran's status by both the Iranian leadership and the public (Tocha 2009: 23) as is the similar case in India. (Sauer 2007: 25) From an individual perspective; the constituted middle class in Iran throughout the last twenty years including bureaucrats, technicians and managers who built their careers on the nuclear programme do obviously not want to lose what they have gained so far. This might be another reason for why the argument emphasizing the necessity of the nuclear programme for Iran could be recited by also well-situated elites who are politically

influential. (Mayer 2004: 75-77) Since the nuclear programme has become a matter of prestige while also being a matter of interest for a considerable amount of people in Iran, it becomes hard for the EU to prevail on Iran through any strategy that might include positive or even negative inducements.

As herein before mentioned the existing flaws in the non-proliferation regime creates problems in the legitimization of the demand of the EU. Apart from these, they also lead Iran to concoct an excuse for its situation. Historically speaking, especially the United States' refusal of ratifying CTBT under Bush administration or his decision on initiating a civilian nuclear cooperation in 2006 with India as a country who has never signed the NPT has affected Iran's and so many other actors' trust on the fairness of the regime. Moreover, the other double standard situation which also increased the number of advocates of Iran's nuclear programme was that Iraq, a non-nuclear weapons country, was being attacked by USA, but North Korea as a nuclear weapon country has never been faced with a threat like military intervention. (Sauer 2007: 19-25) Having said that, USA's changing nuclear trade policies might be considered as a subordination of the normative power of the NPT while making European Union the considered emerging defender of the fundamental core of the non-proliferation regime. (Kobia 2008: 34-35) Thus, the problems, caused by the USA's preferences not favoring non-proliferation regime, are interestingly creating an important portion of the EU's motivation to be in the locomotive role in the case of Iran. In addition to this, well known historical hostility and bad memories in the minds of Iran and USA caused by several incidents like the 1953 Iranian coup d'état and the overthrowing of the Iranian Prime Minister Mosaddegh which is accepted as a CIA/US Embassy led operation or the US Embassy hostage crisis which was seen as an offense against American nationals etc., create troubles for the USA to be seen as a trustable adversary by Iran. Further explanations coming from Washington by George W. Bush describing Iran as one corner of the axis of evil together with Iraq and North Korea were the rupture of any possible good relations between those two countries. (Mazucelli 2007: 3-4) Therefore, as both to be a preventer of a possible military escalation between Iran and USA and also to give a late but steady response to the divisions among the EU countries when the Iraq case was on the table, the EU was willing to be in a pivotal role in the case of Iran and to prevent USA from a possible unilateral act. (Santini 2010: 473)

In consideration of these triggers; the first reason for the EU to be devotedly involved in the case of Iran, is its commitment to the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Indeed, as stated in the 2003 EU meetings in Brussels; "WMD and missile proliferation puts at risk the security of our states, our peoples and our interests around the world." (Council of the European Union 2003) Therefore, especially after North Korean withdrawal from the NPT, another country flouting the rules and posing a danger could not be acceptable for the non-proliferation regime, because besides of the physical risks of having a country with weapons of mass destruction, letting it to have this capability non-compliantly would create bigger problems for the whole regime. In this manner, the case of Iran seemed to be a so called silver bullet for the CFSP which have aimed to reach comprehensive decisions for a long time. Indeed, protecting the non-proliferation regime with a comprehensive policy is important, because, as Ulf Linden from the Department for Disarmament and Non-proliferation at the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs said (2007, quoted in Laşan 2007: 33), it is "a shared concern that the international non-proliferation regime must not be weakened."

Second of all, there are practical reasons for the EU to see the case as more than an attempt to emphasize the importance of the non-proliferation regime. Precisely, efforts labored by the EU for the Middle East Peace Process in terms of human rights and democracy promotion would be a total waste in the case where Iran, as the country which is capable of destabilizing the region, has nuclear weapons, and this then leading to a war. On the other hand, any scenario like this would most likely increase the arms race and the endeavours of other countries in the region to acquire nuclear weapons. (Laşan 2007: 33-34) In the existing setting, the only countries having nuclear weapons and the capability using them against the EU are the five UNSC permanent members. (Smith 2003: 18) Thus, in the scenario where Iran also has the same capability, besides being aspired to become a global power and containing two nuclear power states in itself, the EU would to certain extend be obliged to intervene due to the direct security threat.

In other respects, the general motivation of the EU in the big picture contains and is affected by the Big Three's individual interests. Briefly, Iran has almost always been approached friendly by Germany, even after the Iranian revolution and the Iran-Iraq war when all the other European countries grew away from Iran. As for so long being the biggest Western trade partner and most important technology supplier of Iran, it is

undeniable that Germany has big economic interests over Iran. (Laşan 2007: 29) Besides the fact that NPT regime constitutes a big prominence for the international security for Germany, is evident through how Berlin tried to initiate consensus among the European states in the Review Conference in New York in May 2005 (Müller 2005), Germany has not been as strict as its compeers, having a softer approach, i.e. by accepting that Iran might have limited enrichment capabilities. (Bergenäs 2010: 499) Indeed, in 2006 it was even declared by the German Minister of Defense, Franz Josef Jung, that "One cannot forbid Iran from doing what other countries in the world are doing in accordance with international law." (Charbonneau 2006)

On the other hand, for France who concerns a lot about the image of the EU, which has already damaged because of Iraq divisions, the case of Iran has an important place in its agenda. However, as the country who wants to give a voice to Europe, the case of Iran in fact constitutes a dilemma for France. On the one hand in order to provide sustainability of the non-proliferation regime France has to work for non-proliferation in the world which means the elimination of its own arsenals. On the other hand the situation makes France walk on pins and needles since the main objective for France, in the final analysis, is Europe's security.²⁸ Thus, with a wide consensus over maintaining nuclear deterrence, nuclear arsenals are still seen as an insurance against any future major risks in France. (Tertrais 2007: 251)

Historically speaking, the relations between Iran and United Kingdom have generally been unfriendly. This is mostly caused by Iran's lack of trust towards UK, with reasons going far back in time. As embodied in Ayatollah Khomeini's words 'the aged wolf of imperialism', Britain has generally been best remembered for its close ties with USA and colonial past. (Tarock 1999: 58) Indeed, when Iran first became an issue, the major importance for the UK was on the opportunity of healing its transatlantic relations which had been at loggerheads because of the divisions in the Iraq intervention. Particularly, this tension between Europe and USA was evident through a degree of mutual recrimination even if it was not formerly visible in public. (Mazucelli 2007: 4) That's why it is plausible to say that although USA and EU have had different

28 France's concerns about the security of Europe which might be undermined by Iran were visible in Sarkozy's speeches. For instance, in one of his speeches in 2008 where he said that "The security of Europe is at stake. Countries in Asia and the Middle East are rapidly developing ballistic capacities. I am thinking in particular of Iran," which is "increasing the range of its missiles while serious suspicions weigh on its nuclear program.", (Sarkozy 2008, quoted in Erlanger 2008)

approaches on an issue once again, this time, for UK it has been the chance to play its traditional bridge role in the transatlantic relations while also making sure that Germany and France would not give compromises inimical to the interests of UK and USA. (Laşan 2007: 31-32)

Although for both parties there are several reasons for being determined in their positioning, it seems there is an asymmetry of motivation. However, as opposed to what coercive diplomacy theory regards as necessary for the coercer, this imbalance in motivations takes up for Iranian side. In other words; it is, surely, very critical for the international community to be assured that Iran is not a nuclear weapon country, but under the circumstances where Iran has many regional security concerns, and additional to this since some other countries in the world are already privileged with having nuclear weapons without facing up to painful consequences, i.e. India, North Korea, and Israel, it is likely to assume that Iran's aspirations to possess nuclear weapons are relatively higher than his coercers' aspirations to put the brakes on Iran.

5. Conclusion

This paper aimed to analyze how and to what extend the EU's engagement with Iran meet the necessary elements of a successful strategy indicated by the coercive diplomacy theory. In order to make the analysis properly, the theoretical framework of the coercive diplomacy established by Alexander George was firstly examined. Even though an assertion of giving a complete investigation of George's contributions to coercive diplomacy theory and practice in case studies throughout limited pages of this paper would be admittedly beyond the pale, the key elements of the theory and considered necessary examples from history in respect to the case of Iran have been tried to be evaluated.

Coercive diplomacy as the method using the diplomatic tools instead of force provides states to achieve their political objectives without being obliged to pay the expenses in the case of a military strike. In the broad scale, – where on the one edge there is the use of force and on the other there are the cases which can be solved with simple bargaining – coercive diplomacy can be described as the ideal way to persuade the opponent by being sufficiently intimidating but still mild enough to be profitable for both parties. In this sense, George's differentiation of coercive diplomacy from both compellence and deterrence has a special importance with its emphasis on the

integration of positive inducements and threats. Specifically, George's definition takes a distance to Schelling's explanation of coercive diplomacy which refers to the long standing, but in one respect obsolete, power relations' definition, since Schelling underlines the capability of the coercer to affect the enemy to do something which it would otherwise not do by using a threat of punishment and active use of force in case of the non-compliance. However, as we also see in the case of Iran, it is hard to talk about 'concentrated power blocks' and polarization anymore, as was the case in the Cold War era, since the power is now more dispersed among many actors and thus, it is more dynamic than determinate. This fact necessitates the states to watch their steps and reconsider any possible scenario in which a military operation is involved.

Considering the criticisms against the USA and the Western alliance regarding the outcomes of their involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan especially, it is one more time proved that the use of force is a dangerous tool which is most likely to backfire. The broad analysis show that in different fields of persuasion the long-term engagements including developmental and cooperative approaches instead of directly using force, has a higher success rate. In this manner, as it is stated in the theory, the significant role of the coercer state is to find the optimal blend of carrots and sticks for the case and employ them in the right combination sequence of coercion, persuasion, positive inducements and compromise. Thus, through George's conceptualization, it is possible to conclude that, in today's world where the states are not as independent as they used to be from the societal questionings since they are now more responsible to give certain justifications for their acts both to their own societies and also to the international community, the inclusion of positive incentives and negotiation-based approach in the coercive diplomacy employment makes it possible for states to increase the legitimacy of their persuasion attempts towards the other countries.

In the way of establishing a prosperous strategy, the dynamics making success of the coercive diplomacy are intricate and manifold, and moreover, it is also emphasized that there are some hampering factors which make it difficult to measure 'the success' during the process as hereinbefore mentioned. Nevertheless, in compliance with the major characteristics of the coercive diplomacy, listed as the demand, the threat and the time limit, the so far key elements of the EU's strategy over Iran that are determinant on its success can be scrutinized in order to make possible alterations in the strategy. In this study, the assessment of the theory over the case showed that

there are certain flaws in the EU approach which are not compatible with what the coercive diplomacy theory asserts. In this manner; the featuring elements of the EU's strategy have been criticized in the sense that 1) It still remains questionable how it is possible for the EU to draw borders for the appropriate behavior for non-proliferation in a regime where there are several points demolishing the legitimacy of such a demand for not having nuclear weapons. 2) Because of several reasons, i.e. the multi-headedness of the threat sources, not having credible reputation etc., the threats directed towards Iran are not perceived credible by Iran and the sanction-wise threats of the EU are regarded as problematic, which also detains EU to obtain international support without any reserve. 3) None of the deadlines have been properly met by Iran. Therefore, because of the coalitional difficulties, 'the time limit' or 'sense of urgency' elements of the theory could not be accomplished by the EU. 4) Although the EU's motivation to be the coercer party is strong enough owing to its substantial interests penetrating to the case, Iran's motivation, so to say, to win the game, is relatively bigger than the EU's, since Iran's security and strategic interests are involved in the confrontation, while its nuclear programme also became a prestige matter for it.

Referring to Jakobsen's analysis which claims that when the West is the coercer state, the general tendency in coercive diplomacy cases is temporary/tactical success, it is noteworthy to consider that even if there will be an improvement in the negotiations and success will seem likely, there is always the possibility of having temporary success. It is, on the other hand, an inherent problem in a coercive diplomacy application to verify whether states are putting an end to their clandestine efforts to obtain WMD. (Jakobsen 2007: 37) Therefore, having temporary solutions for the inherent problem or an ostensible success might be useful for nothing but buying the target state extra time. Since it is, to a certain extent, a matter of time for a country to complete its developing nuclear weapons (which can be regarded as the case also for Iran), the time limit criteria is better to be met in order to have a real improvement in negotiations. In addition to this, the very general EU principles giving importance to such as the use of civilian power, multilateralism or strategic cooperation are also necessary to be more emphasized in shaping the EU approach towards the non-proliferation subjects of the engagement with Iran.

Besides the fact that the engagement of the EU has some beleaguered outcomes within or without the framework of coercive diplomacy theory, the case of Iran can be

seen as an issue where the EU is on its mettle in the international arena in terms of security and non-proliferation matters. It is a well-known fact that in the post Cold War era many new dynamics and both external and internal aspects have been added into issues related to security, legitimacy and nuclear matters. New settlement of the security understandings of the states after throwing off the stress of the Cold War, and also the inclusion of the non-state actors into the international security matters, created new global challenges in the world. This emergence, needless to say, have created needs for states to establish different methods of engagement with the other countries in order to solve the problems, rather than simple use of coercion. From this point of view, one important conclusion of the negotiations process is, undoubtedly, EU's success in its mediation role in the case of Iran by using diplomacy techniques instead of use of force, which has so far prevented an escalation which would possibly have abject consequences for many countries both in the region and in the international arena. On the other hand; it would be more accurate to say that European Union has pointed out a direction where it needs to be incrementalist and sensitive in making its policies in order to reverse the so far reputation of 'not walking the walk but talking the talk'. In this sense, throughout the Iran engagement, the EU has taken important steps in the way of obtaining comprehensiveness in its institutional structure, among its member states and also through the inclusion of the international actors.

Furthermore, even if there is a considerable amount of people who sees the process as a zero-sum game, in fact, the engagement of the EU with Iran can be invertible to a win-win situation. The reflections of the EU's general principles favor a long-term engagement in a comprehensive and negotiated manner with Iran (which might be seen as opposed to USA's stance), and thus, give the EU an edge in solving the trust issue with Iran. Moreover; in regards to the latest developments in the Arab world, it is once again understood that the issues in the Middle East are complicated and without a sensitive calculation of the regional power equations it is hard to find proper solutions. Thus, the global and regional interests of the countries and the general strategic environment are prominent parameters for all the steps taken. Indeed, the seven cases, which George and Simons examined in their books, demonstrated that the global strategic environment is effective on shaping the conditions for coercive diplomacy. Not surprisingly, one major element constituting both the EU aspirations for implying coercive diplomacy and also the engagement's so far outcomes is, therefore,

associated with how the global and regional power struggle is penetrated to the case of Iran and how the role of Iran's potentials are perceived by the actors of this power struggle. In this sense, Iran's influential power over the regional interactions must also be added to the calculations by the EU.

As a conclusion, to be able to make an improvement in the process it is crucial for the EU to take into account the fact that its demands touches upon Iran's vital interests and in order to justify these demands it needs a better legitimization basement. At the same time, it is also necessary for Iran to understand that by providing EU adding substantial experiences and a very prominent achievement to the Union's history, Iran can have substantial advantages owing to the possibility of improved economic and political relations with the European countries, and thus, this possible cooperation with the EU can obviate the isolation of Iran.

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